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This thesis argues that Mississippi’s state militia after the American Civil War 
developed into a functional arm of the state to supplant extralegal paramilitary groups.  
However, that militia transformed between 1865 and 1890 from an organization devoted 
to protecting African-American political and civil rights into a mechanism for the 
enforcement of white supremacy. Mississippi’s Constitution of 1868 made the governor  
Commander-in-Chief of the state militia and designated that one of the militia’s 
responsibilities was  “to suppress riots and insurrections.” While the law provided other 
reasons for using the militia, this thesis argues that Mississippi’s governors only used the 
militia to put down alleged riots and insurrections, while contemporary newspapers used 
the terms “riot” and “insurrection” to associate criminality with African-American 
political activism. This thesis also narrates the life of an African-American man named 
Oliver Cromwell and his presence at two representative “race riots” in the Clinton Riot of 
1875 and the Leflore County Massacre of 1889 to highlight how the militia impacted 
individual citizens. Ultimately, this work concludes that the transformation of 
Mississippi’s state militia between 1865 and 1890 reveals how civilian access to the 
militia’s ranks and how the governor chose to deploy that militia impactfully reduced 
African-American rights in late-nineteenth century Mississippi and contributed to the 
disenfranchisement found in the state’s Constitution of 1890. 
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In 1843, Julia Cromwell gave birth to a mixed-race son in Wilkinson County, 
Mississippi and prophetically named him Oliver. Like his European namesake who 
sparked England’s Civil War in the seventeenth century, Mississippi’s Oliver Cromwell 
grew up to fan the flames of racial politics in his native state for decades after the 
American Civil War. By the time he was twenty years old, Cromwell served in the 5th 
United States Colored Heavy Artillery regiment in the American Civil War. In his early 
thirties, he paraded the streets of Clinton, Mississippi in full military regalia as a leader of 
an African-American militia before participating in one of the most notorious race riots in 
the state’s history. Fourteen years later, the state militia of which he was once a member 
ran him out of Mississippi. Finally, the illustrious troublemaker died in a hail of gunfire 
while taking out five Ku Klux Klan members as a parting gift. Cromwell lived up to his 
name and remained at the center of political and racial turmoil in Mississippi throughout 
his life, coming to represent the broader societal changes occurring therein.  
Cromwell’s life illustrates significant historical shifts in Mississippi. From the 
Civil War to the formation of Jim Crow in the 1890s, Mississippi saw racial and political 
uncertainty on an unprecedented scale, and civilian militias became a prominent 
mediating force. This work will explore how Mississippi’s state militia, as developed 
after emancipation in 1865, shaped the way that political parties fought for and projected 
their power in Mississippi through the ratification of the state’s next, and current, 
constitution written in 1890. The period between the end of the Civil War and the 
establishment of Jim Crow control in the South often reads as a history of unique 
Democratic Party, and consequently white, patterns of violence bent on establishing 
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white supremacy and political hegemony. However, this research will complicate that 
narrative by exploring how the Democratic Party of the late 1870s and 1880s utilized the 
state militia in the same fundamental way that the Republican Party did in the 1860s. 
Namely, both parties employed the state militia to reassert control when challenges 
confronted their political hold on the state government. The difference, then, was the 
Republican Party’s use of the militia to protect African American rights, whereas the 
Democratic Party sought to solidify white supremacy.   
Oliver Cromwell’s life represents how the state’s politics changed from the Civil 
War to 1890, and how the militia took an active role in that change. After tumultuous 
extralegal militia skirmishes during Presidential Reconstruction (1865-1868), the 
Constitution of 1868 clarified the distinction between legal and illegal militias, and 
placed state militia operations in the governor’s hands. The militia then became an 
inescapably political tool. As Republican Party power waned in the mid-to-late 1870s, 
Republican governor Adelbert Ames mustered the militia in a vain attempt to retain 
control of the capital and to remind citizens of his party’s continued hold on power. By 
1890, the Democratic party once again dominated Mississippi politics, yet rising 
Republican sentiment both in the state and in the rest of the country pushed an uneasy 
Democratic governor Robert Lowry to raise the state’s militia once again. 
Two specific instances reveal the overarching purpose of Mississippi’s state 
militia.  The first is the Clinton Riot of 1875, where African-American militia units 
played important roles both during and after the riot to protect their lives and Republican 
political interest. The other example is the Leflore County Massacre of 1889 in Leflore 
County, Mississippi where, conversely, white militia units were called upon to represent 
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the Democratic Party. Both events saw a political party employing militia units to defend 
their interests, yet both militias failed to ensure peace or put down hostilities. Militia 
deployment, then, built on the idea that force could be used if necessary, though troops 
were almost never sent to areas where violence had been threatened or performed.  
Both the Clinton Riot and the Leflore County Massacre also reveal the central 
controversy of Mississippi’s late nineteenth century politics: race. Long before W. E. B. 
Du Bois famously stated that “the problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the 
color-line,” one Mississippi writer assigned the same problem to the nineteenth century, 
arguing that “the issue in this State is one of race.”1 The militia walked hand in hand with 
politics; political parties, however, were also tied directly to race. Though exceptions 
certainly existed, one may safely generalize that the Democratic Party represented white 
citizens, while the Republican Party represented black citizens. The militia’s political 
roots then tied it heavily to race relations. The militia thereby simultaneously embodied 
both political and racial division in Mississippi.  
The racial component of Mississippi’s state militia reveals one of its most 
important contributions in the late nineteenth century. An examination of the state’s 
militia is necessarily an examination of the position of African Americans in the state. 
The presence of African American militia units, let alone their actions, symbolizes the 
empowerment of black people in Mississippi during Reconstruction and under a 
Republican government. The use of white militias to suppress black political organization 
 
1 W.E.B. Du Bois. The Souls of Black Folk (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 
2003), 16.; “The Mississippi Troubles: A Truthful Statement of the Situation: Number 1,” 




in Leflore County in 1889 conversely embodies the diminishment of civil rights brought 
on by Democratic political majority in the development of an oppressive Jim Crow 
regime. The language of legislation concerning the militia in both the 1868 and 1890 
state constitutions offers insight on both how the militia was used and why. By including 
the phrase “to suppress riots and insurrections” into the list of reasons for militia 
deployment, the governor could either represent any racial conflict (which in Mississippi 
could be counted on at the time) as a “riot” to deploy militia and reinforce control, or 
engineer a racial conflict for the expressed purpose of inciting violence and militia use, as 
the Democratic Party often did.2   
This thesis will argue that between 1865 and 1890, both the Democratic and 
Republican parties in Mississippi utilized the state militia to enforce and symbolize party 
control; however, the militia transformed during that period from an organization to 
protect and empower African Americans to an organization bent on their suppression and 
disenfranchisement. The militia thereby operated in the same way, but for stark opposite 
purposes. Chapter One will closely examine how the Clinton Riot of 1875 represented 
Republican and African-American attempts to sustain the rights won in emancipation by 
using legal state militia units. Chapter Two will track the militia’s status under 
Democratic governor Robert Lowry, exploring the ways fusion politics and Democratic 
Party insecurity produced the militia’s resurrection at the Leflore County Massacre of 
1889. By focusing on those two events, this work will track the militia’s changes over 
 
2 Constitution of the State of Mississippi, Adopted May 15, 1868, Article IX, Sec. 




time while highlighting the functional continuities between political parties that exercised 
the right to wield the militia’s power.  
 
Historiographical Contribution  
Though technically a military organization, the state militia’s scope extended to all 
spheres of civilian life when mobilized. Consequently, this examination of Mississippi’s 
state militia in the contentious period between 1865 and 1890 will contribute to the 
economic, military, political, racial, and social history of the state. Furthermore, citizen-
soldiering and the suppression of “race riots” real or imagined remains a highly prevalent 
and debated issue in the United States today, so studying the way that everyday citizens 
of different races interacted with their respective governments to militarize civilian life 
may offer insight on historically persistent racial, social, and political issues. While much 
has been written on Mississippi, its laws, racial division, and politics, little material exists 
incorporating the state militia into that history, and an even smaller amount has been 
written with the militia at the center.  
Though several works reference Mississippi’s state militia as a passing contributor in 
a much larger historical narrative, this work will expand the lens on the militia as a much 
more important agent. The militia’s centrality to the period is twofold: first, the militia 
actively contributed to events, such as riots, when they happened, and second, the militia 
offers a symbol of the overarching societal changes in the state. Citizens who formed the 
militia and the governor who controlled it shaped the racial, political, and social future of 
the state by either their participation in or exclusion from the militia. Both the active and 
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symbolic nature of the organization thereby warrant close, specific study that has seldom 
been done.  
The Clinton Riot of 1875 and the Leflore County Massacre of 1889 fall neatly into 
this study as two representative examples of militia activity over time. Both events have 
been studied thoroughly in isolation, yet this study seeks to examine them in conjunction. 
By placing the events side-by-side, similarities and differences may be drawn which 
reveal larger historical truths about the militia’s importance to Mississippi in an age of 
racially motivated violence. Specifically studying the militia’s standing across both riots 
at the same time further informs the history of each separate event. By looking at the riots 
together, one may see not only why the events happened, but how one aspect of 
Mississippian life, the state militia, could contribute to and perpetuate political systems 
which catalyzed violence over the span of twenty years.  
Another important, yet less tangible, way that this work will contribute to the existing 
literature is by examining contemporary ideas about civilian-based military organizations.  
While it is impossible to know how each individual thought, one blanket ideology occurs 
frequently in contemporary newspapers and letters. Both during and after the Civil War, 
southern whites developed a patent distaste for peacetime militia organization, 
associating organized forces with despotic standing armies. This paranoia spiked greatly 
with the inception of black militia units during Reconstruction, yet as will be shown, 
arguments over the constitutionality of peacetime militias, regardless of race, continued 






 This study will most directly contribute to the historiography of the state militia in 
Mississippi by centering its narrative around that organization. Little direct research has 
been done specifically on Mississippi’s state militia or state militias otherwise, yet a few 
valuable studies exist. Otis A. Singletary’s Negro Militia and Reconstruction offers the 
most specific, targeted examination of state militias, particularly African American units, 
in Reconstruction. Published in 1957, Singletary’s book is dated, yet in many cases the 
book fairly divides the blame for the violence of the period on both white and black 
forces. Singletary argues that black militia units, though empowering to black people in 
the South, also heightened antagonism from whites solely by their existence. The book 
provides a useful analysis of the Clinton Riot of 1875 and specific details on the militia’s 
role during and after the riot. Despite its age, Negro Militia and Reconstruction remains 
one of the most thorough accounts of its subject. This study will build on Singletary’s by 
providing greater context for Reconstruction militias and by more closely examining their 
ramifications into the post-Reconstruction era.3 
 Andrew F. Lang’s In the Wake of War: Military Occupation, Emancipation, and 
Civil War America provides a more recent examination of militia usage in the South after 
the Civil War. Lang’s book studies the process of military occupation by the United 
States as it developed through the Mexican American and Civil wars. Lang closely 
examines how citizen-soldiering, at first viewed by whites as a valorous enterprise, 
became a nuisance in the minds of whites after the extensive occupations of the Civil 
 
3 Otis A. Singletary, Negro Militia and Reconstruction (Austin, University of 
Texas Press, 1957). 
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War. However, African Americans, after achieving freedom from slavery in that war, 
embraced militia participation to protect their newly won rights and to exercise 
autonomy. This research gives insight particularly into the ideologies concerning militia 
usage and peacetime occupation and provides a thorough account of African American 
militia involvement during Reconstruction. This thesis will rely on Lang’s arguments 
connecting Civil War experiences, concepts of citizenship, and armed militia 
participation. However, this work will also extend those ideas further into Reconstruction 
and New South era to explore how citizen-soldiering as a fundamental part of 
Mississippians’ experience extended well beyond Lang’s timeline. 4 
 
Civil Conflicts in Mississippi  
 While the primary focus of this work will be the state militia, that militia’s history 
cannot be separated from the individual histories of civil conflicts in Mississippi. The 
state of Mississippi experienced frequent bloody conflicts in the late nineteenth century. 
While many of these instances have been researched to varied degrees, this thesis 
contributes to their historiography by adding further details about each respective conflict 
and by linking those conflicts together in one purposeful framework.  
No previous literature pairs the Clinton Riot of 1875 and the Leflore County 
Massacre of 1889 together, yet researchers have written on both separately. Nicholas 
Lemann’s Redemption: The Last Battle of the Civil War offers a detailed narrative of the 
overthrow of Mississippi’s Reconstruction government. Lemann specifically addresses 
 
4 Andrew F. Lang, In the Wake of War: Military Occupation, Emancipation, and 
Civil War America (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2017).  
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the Clinton Riot of 1875, events leading up to the riot, the aftermath, and where black 
militia units fit into each of the events. Leman relies heavily on the drama of the period to 
engage a popular audience; however, his usage of specific names, dates, and primary 
sources from the period, particularly from Republican Governor Adelbert Ames, offers a 
broad portrait of how and why the Reconstruction government of Mississippi was forced 
out of the state. This thesis adds further context to Lemann’s by placing it within a 
greater conceptual and historical framework. While Lemann primarily focuses on the 
narrative of events, this work places those events within the context of broad historical 
change and uses a far longer timeline by which to track the ramifications of the 
Redemption movement and the state militia’s role therein.5 
 Melissa Jones’s article “The Clinton Riot of 1875: From Riot to Massacre” offers 
another detailed exploration of the event and its legacy. More specifically, she draws 
upon personal accounts of how White Line paramilitaries murdered Black 
Mississippians. Jones also provides an excellent discussion of the Clinton Riot in 
historical memory, examining narratives taught through local historical markers and in 
scholarship. The article also discusses the subtle linguistic impacts of a conflict being 
described as either a “riot” or a “massacre,” supporting this work’s claims that such 
subtle differences affected the deployment of state militia units. Jones’s article gives a 
brief overview of the events at Clinton and their importance, yet this thesis will build on 
her work by expanding the timeline to show how paramilitary developments from the 
time of emancipation produced the Clinton Riot. Furthermore, this work will place the 
 
5 Nicholas Lemann, Redemption: The Last Battle of the Civil War (New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006).  
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Clinton Riot in conversation with other race riots of the period to reveal broader historical 
change occurring in late nineteenth century Mississippi with the militia at the forefront.6 
 William F. Holmes wrote the definitive account of the Leflore County Massacre 
to date with his article “The Leflore County Massacre and the Demise of the Colored 
Farmers’ Alliance.” Holmes offers a descriptive narrative of the Massacre’s root causes 
and consequences. Holmes, however, narrows his focus to the context of its influence on 
the Colored Farmers’ Alliance, a Black Populist organization in the state led by none 
other than Oliver Cromwell. While he recognizes the limits of researching such a 
disputed event, Holmes offers a thorough study of the Massacre which utilizes facts from 
contemporary newspapers both from Mississippi and across the country to piece together 
a reliable account. Like the Jones’s article on the Clinton Riot, this thesis will build on 
Holmes’s work by drawing from unused primary resources to contribute detail and by 
examining the greater context within which the Leflore County Massacre occurred. This 
study also places the state militia, rather than the Colored Farmers’ Alliance, squarely at 
the center of the event to produce a new historical lens for that event’s importance.7 
 Two doctoral dissertations provide unique lenses by which to view the events 
discussed in this work. Melinda Meek Hennessy’s “To Live and Die in Dixie: 
Reconstruction Race Riots in the South” chronicles and examines every race riot, within 
a certain mold, which took place during Reconstruction. Her work includes a lengthy 
 
6 Melissa Janczewski Jones, “The Clinton Riot of 1875: From Riot to Massacre” 
(Jackson: Mississippi History Now, The Mississippi Historical Society, 2015).  
7 William F. Holmes, “The Leflore County Massacre and the Demise of the 
Colored Farmers’ Alliance,” Phylon, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Atlanta: Clark Atlanta University 




examination of the Clinton Riot of 1875 in Mississippi, which includes extraordinary 
detail, research, and contextualization. While her treatment of the Clinton Riot only exists 
as a small portion of a much larger study, it nevertheless offers a thorough account and 
useful commentary on the Clinton Riot as one of many other race riots in the south. By 
connecting the Clinton Riot to the Leflore County Massacre, this thesis consequently 
expands on Hennessy’s work by revealing how certain elements of Reconstruction race 
riots carried over into racial politics of the New South.8 
 William Bland Whitley’s “Precious Memories: Narrative of the Democracy in 
Mississippi 1865-1915” traces the Democratic Party’s political and social tactics as it 
developed from the end of the Civil War, through Reconstruction, and ultimately to the 
Jim Crow Era. Whitley’s study on the Democratic Party’s successful Redemption 
campaign of 1875-1876 discusses in specific detail the Clinton Riot of 1875 and the 
racial conflicts leading up to and stemming from the event. While Whitley’s study 
focuses on larger themes, his examination of the Democratic Party’s rhetoric in the period 
and its method of appealing to external issues (such as religion) to establish white 
supremacy offers a unique insight into the conflicts of the mid-1870s. His work explores 
the ways that race riots, specifically the Clinton Riot, were depicted by Democratic 
newspapers to demonize African Americans, making the dissertation useful in 
establishing a holistic picture of the event. This thesis then draws on Whitley’s readings 
 
8 Melinda Meek Hennessy, To Live and Die in Dixie: Reconstruction Race Riots 
in the South (Ohio: Doctoral Dissertation at Kent State University, 1978).  
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and offers further evidence to prove how newspaper accounts manipulated rhetoric to 
criminalize and undermine black political organization.9  
 
Race in Mississippi  
 A central historiographical contribution of this work will be race as tied to both 
the state militia and civil conflict in Mississippi. Fortunately, a wealth of important 
research exists on the subject, specifically within the timeline of this study. Stephen 
Cresswell’s Rednecks, Redeemers, and Race: Mississippi After Reconstruction 1877-
1917 offers a broad portrait of Mississippi’s politics, social life, and especially race in the 
contentious period after Reconstruction. Cresswell’s book builds on existing New South 
literature by examining the specific ways that Mississippi could undergo economic, 
political, and racial change affecting the entire south while remaining fundamentally 
untouched in making true advancement.  Cresswell excels in examining “race riots” and 
exploring contradictions between the events and their narratives as written by 
newspapers. The book also touches on the militia’s use in the state, specifically in the 
Leflore County Massacre and in the later Jim Crow Era. This thesis will then build on 
Cresswell’s book by closely examining how the state militia influenced and was 
influenced by Mississippi’s New South prospects.10 
 Another major work uncovering racial history in late nineteenth century 
Mississippi is Omar Ali’s In the Lion’s Mouth: Black Populism in the New South 1886-
 
9 William Bland Whitley, Precious Memories: Narratives of the Democracy in 
Mississippi 1865-1915 (Florida: Doctoral Dissertation at the University of Florida, 2003).  
10 Stephen Edward Cresswell, Rednecks, Redeemers, and Race: Mississippi After 
Reconstruction 1877-1917 (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2006).  
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1900. Ali closely examines the rise, prosperity, and fall of the Black Populist Movement 
in the South, arguing that the Black Populists were an autonomous political entity without 
reliance on the larger white Populist movement. Ali’s book sheds light on an otherwise 
little studied movement, and his attention to detail and scrupulous mining of sources 
presents unique information that would otherwise be hard to find. His research on the 
Leflore County Massacre, an incident which gravitated around the Colored Farmers’ 
Alliance (a Black Populist organization) and the life of Oliver Cromwell offers extensive 
detail on the Massacre, its causes, its effects, and how the racial politics of the age 
intermingled therein.11 
 A premier work on racial history in Mississippi is Neil R. McMillen’s Dark 
Journey: Black Mississippians in the Age of Jim Crow, which offers one of the most 
broad, extensive examinations of the African American experience in Mississippi in the 
Jim Crow Era. McMillen’s work looks at race history uniquely from the bottom-up, black 
perspective, focusing on the efforts of African Americans to secure their rights, 
strengthen their communities, and fight racism in Jim Crow Mississippi. Though this 
study precedes the Jim Crow Era, McMillen’s study incorporates the legacies of 
Reconstruction and Redemption, and his work also contributes general information on 
black life in Mississippi that is crucial to any research on racial history in the state. This 
thesis will then build on McMillen’s already extensive work by placing the state militia in 
a more central role in shaping the Jim Crow’s development than does Dark Journey.12 
 
11 Omar H. Ali, In the Lion’s Mouth: Black Populism in the New South 1886-1900 
(Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2010).  
12 Neil R. McMillen, Dark Journey: Black Mississippians in the Age of Jim Crow 




New South  
 Though less directly, this thesis will also build on studies of the New South. Two 
important works on the history of the New South offer crucial insight into understanding 
both the world created by Redemption and the overarching historical narratives that 
produced the Leflore County Massacre. First, C. Vann Woodward’s landmark Origins of 
the New South: 1877-1913 surveys the development and perpetuation of the New South 
from Reconstruction through the early years of the Jim Crow Era. Woodward offers 
critical insights on the Democratic Party’s role in southern states, especially in 
Mississippi, revealing insecurities within the party that lead to events like the Leflore 
County Massacre. Woodward also traces important continuities between the first and 
second “Mississippi Plans” as they were called in the period, both of which bolstered 
white Democratic influence in Mississippi. This work uses Woodward’s narrative but 
contributes a unique reading in its specificity to Mississippi and its focus on the state 
militia therein. 13  
 The second work on the New South pivotal to understanding the world of the 
Leflore County Massacre is Edward L. Ayers’s The Promise of the New South: Life after 
Reconstruction. Ayers, like Woodward, traces continuities from Reconstruction through 
the Jim Crow Era, examining the promises southern governments made and how those 
promises manifested. Ayers’s work provides useful insights on the divisions between 
 
13C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South: 1877-1913. A History of the 
South, Vol. IX, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, The Littlefield Fund for 




citizens and their representatives in government, highlighting the failure of many New 
South governments to fulfill their promises of prosperity. As the state militia in 
Mississippi and elsewhere was composed of citizens rather than professional soldiers, 
understanding how such citizens of any race lived and experienced change on a day-to-
day basis offers an extra layer of understanding about motivations and experiences in the 
New South. This thesis will contribute to both Ayers’ and Woodward’s works by 
examining how the modernizing influences of the New South era produced direct interest 
in a more organized and professional state militia in Mississippi.14 
 
Mississippi History 
Since this work focuses solely on militias in Mississippi, it necessarily contributes 
to the state’s historiography. For many years, textbooks and monographs on Mississippi’s 
history documented events like the Civil War and Reconstruction through blatantly Lost 
Cause lenses. Such scholarship painted the Confederate cause as a virtuous fight for 
states’ rights while neglecting slavery’s influence in producing the Civil War. Lost Cause 
ideologues furthermore depicted the Reconstruction era as a total failure, blaming both 
Republican and African-American officials for corrupting governments and incurring 
massive debts for southern states. However, more modern research has sought to correct 
those ills and provide a truthful and largely accurate narrative. One recent general study 
of Mississippi consulted for this work is Dennis J. Mitchell’s A New History of 
Mississippi. Mitchell’s book studies Mississippi but moves beyond Lost Cause narratives 
 
14 Edward L. Ayers, The Promise of the New South: Life after Reconstruction. 
(New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).  
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which so tainted earlier works. Mitchell’s book discusses Reconstruction in a broad but 
informative way, offering a basic understanding of a complex period in state history. 
However, Mitchell’s work is necessarily broad, so this thesis will provide specific details 
and a greater study of the state militia’s role in events that Mitchell covers only for their 
broader historical significance.15 
 Though not a general history, Dorothy Overstreet Pratt’s Sowing the Wind: The 
Mississippi Constitutional Convention of 1890 minutely examines one of the state’s most 
important historical events. The Mississippi Constitutional Convention of 1890 and the 
legislation it produced would dramatically alter the state’s future and create a legacy that 
persists today. Scrupulously studying each aspect of the constitution which changed from 
its predecessors, Pratt incorporates into her work details such as the state militia as a 
provision in the constitution  while tracing how events such as the Leflore County 
Massacre influenced the legislators of the convention. The state militia, as this study will 
show, played a pivotal role in pushing the state toward that new constitution, and this 
thesis consequently provides further context for Pratt’s work.16 
 A crucial work on Mississippi’s history, specifically during Reconstruction, is 
William C. Harris’s The Day of the Carpetbagger: Republican Reconstruction in 
Mississippi (1979). Harris’s work is dated and highly influenced by the period in which it 
was written; however, though some of the interpretations are clearly biased, the book 
offers a wealth of factual evidence. Studying militia movements all the way through 
 
15 Dennis J. Mitchell, A New History of Mississippi (Jackson: University Press of 
Mississippi, 2014).  
16 Dorothy Overstreet Pratt, Sowing the Wind: The Mississippi Constitutional 
Convention of 1890 (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2018).  
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Reconstruction will thereby provide a new, necessary update to some of Harris’s 
arguments.17 
Methodology  
 This study draws heavily upon the partisan political press in Mississippi during 
the 1870s and 1880s. Newspapers of the period abound, offering in many cases some of 
the only primary accounts of local incidents. Any attempt to recreate an account of either 
the Clinton Riot or the Leflore County Massacre requires one to draw heavily from 
contemporary newspapers. While an excellent source for first-hand opinions and 
accounts, the newspapers in Mississippi describing both events are somewhat 
problematic. Newspapers of the period, as noted by Nicholas Lemann, “were, 
unapologetically, political party organs.”18 While ample evidence can be drawn from 
newspapers to reconstruct basic events, the bitter partisanship of the day carried over into 
those papers. For example, newspapers covering an instance of racially motivated 
violence would narrate how the violence started in different ways depending on whether 
the paper’s editor was a Republican or Democrat. However, though highly partisan 
papers can often be unreliable when searching for overt truth, they are incredibly useful 
for gauging both public and party opinions. Newspapers, particularly out of Jackson, 
Mississippi, will be drawn from heavily, but in a way that attempts to locate concrete 
facts and to appropriately label opinion masquerading as fact. A useful source for 
checking unsubstantiated newspaper claims will be the Congressional investigations that 
 
17 William C. Harris, The Day of the Carpetbagger: Republican Reconstruction in 
Mississippi (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979).  
18 Lemann, Redemption, 36.  
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occurred in Mississippi following both the Vicksburg and Clinton Riots, providing 
eyewitness testimony from those involved and conclusions from third-party 
congressional investigators.19 
  Legislation will also play a crucial role in this or any study of the state militia in 
the period. Mississippi’s last two constitutions (1868 and 1890) provide an overarching 
framework for this study. As an arm of the state, the militia must be studied first in terms 
of its legislated purposes, even if used differently in reality. While both constitutions 
provide the overarching legislation regarding the militia, smaller laws and executive 
orders also greatly influenced the way that the militia operated, who could join, how the 
militia was funded, and why a person would have wanted to join. For example, while the 
Constitution of 1868 provided a general framework for the militia, a much more 
descriptive law (to be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter) was passed in 1870 
to offer the governor a heavier hand in wielding its power. Smaller executive orders and 
laws passed by the legislature crop up in both the 1870s and 1880s dictating the minutiae 
of the militia. Newspapers often listed such laws along with highly opinionated 
commentaries, and this work will continue to draw heavily from newspapers to find the 
exact wording of minor laws.  
 Personal correspondence will also play a major role in this study. The primary 
mode of interpersonal communication in the era, personal letters between two citizens 
and especially from citizens to the governor place a finger on the pulse of public opinion. 
 
19 George S. Boutwell, Mississippi in 1875 Report of the Select Committee to 
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The personal accounts of angry and scared citizens making desperate pleas to the 
governor or to investigators furnish a personal lens through which to reconstruct 
narratives of Reconstruction and its aftermath. Personal letters also offer insider access to 
public opinion on such controversial issues as race riots and militia service (particularly 
African American militia service). The Adelbert Ames Collection at the Mississippi 
Department of Archives and History is therefore a crucial source base for this project by 
providing Governor Ames’s personal letters and government documents. Ames and his 
wife, Blanche Butler Ames, also carried on near daily correspondence that has been 
published in two volumes, offering crucial insight into the motivations of Governor 
Ames, one of the key characters in this study. 20 
 An important functional designation on the term “militia” must be made before 
moving forward in this study. Chapter One examines the early stages of militia activity 
after emancipation in 1865 and thus necessarily discusses paramilitary organization at 
some length. However, that discussion occurs to provide necessary contextual 
information for how the state militia operated after 1868. The entirety of this work after 
the implementation of the 1868 constitution refers to and studies the legal state militia 
under the governor’s constitutional authority. The distinction between state and 
paramilitary militias was important in that Black Mississippians relied on a clear 
distinction between the two. After 1868, black Mississippians sought to enroll in the state 
militia for armed protection and often refused to fight otherwise. Their white neighbors, 
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however, armed themselves regardless of state sanction. Both communities thereby saw 
that the differences between state and paramilitary militias and their choices of which to 
use produced real consequences. While many “militias” existed in the state, both black 
and white, extralegal or informal militia units such as the White Line groups of the 1870s 
or the ever-popular “posses” of the later Jim Crow Era will be identified as such and are 
not to be interpreted within this work’s argument on how the state militia impacted 
society and transformed over time.  
 This project incorporates several different types of history (social, military, 
economic, legislative, etc.), as the state militia impacted numerous arenas in 
Mississippians’ daily lives. The militia could only be deployed only by the governor, 
making it a governmental and legislative issue, yet ordinary citizens enlisted in and paid 
for the militia with their taxes, creating a social and economic issue. Furthermore, given 
the highly contentious climate of the period, race and political party were directly bound 
to militia movements, making a history of the militia a racial, military, and political 
history. Rather than examine each individual element separately, this project will portray 
the militia broadly and treat such topics as economics, race, and military involvement as 
their prominence in the militia’s activity increased. Using this wide historical lens will 
provide an overall picture of both how and why the militia transformed between 1868 and 
1890 while addressing the far-reaching impacts on the state of Mississippi which resulted 





Chapter I  
 On July 27, 1863, twenty-year-old Oliver Cromwell from Wilkinson County, 
Mississippi enlisted in the 5th U.S. Colored Heavy Artillery.21 Cromwell’s experience 
fighting for his own freedom against the Confederacy represents a much wider 
experience shared by many African Americans in the South during the latter half of the 
Civil War. Holding a weapon and fighting against oppressors produced a newfound sense 
of independence in formerly enslaved African Americans and radically affected the ways 
that they would view the administration of post-Civil War justice.22 In the mid-1870s, 
Cromwell would personally see an African American state militia, devastating race riots, 
and the Republican Party’s last grasp at political control in Mississippi.  
 As Andrew Lang notes in his study of Civil War occupations, the Union Army’s 
occupation of the South shattered many white citizens’ beliefs about the nobility of the 
citizen-soldier while convincing their Black neighbors that citizenship and military 
service were inextricably linked. Lang argues that “while white Union soldiers debated 
the ideological implications of peacetime occupation, African-American troops, as they 
had during the war, continued to believe that the army could and should be used to 
reshape the racial and social landscapes of the postwar South.”23 Thus, the military 
experience of Civil War service both philosophically and practically altered African 
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American militia activity in the postwar period. Philosophically, black people in the 
South came to see the army and state militia as viable sources to enforce the Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Practically, many 
African Americans acquired knowledge and often possession of weapons, owned military 
uniforms, and fought in racially segregated military formations. The African Americans 
who would form post-war militias did so with heightened senses of independence and 
desires to fight for their rights. As early as 1865, former United States Army general Carl 
Schurz noted that “There is nothing that will make [African American freedom] more 
evident than the bodily presence of a negro with a musket on his shoulder.”24 Many 
whites in both the North and South recognized the same correlation between freedom and 
military participation and consequently grew anxious about such enforcement.  
 After losing the Civil War and experiencing the occupation of their cities, 
southern whites profoundly feared the new independence of African Americans, 
particularly in states like Mississippi with predominantly black populations. Nicholas 
Lemann aptly notes that “the idea of an organized, authoritative, and potentially violent 
Negro force touched upon every ancient white fear…about what might happen if Negroes 
were able to do to whites what whites had done to them.”25 Thus, a racialized fear of any 
form of African American power, particularly militarized power, petrified white 
southerners in the helplessness felt after the Civil War. Those white southerners would 
then unjustifiably see black militia units, or any state-sanctioned militia, as a threat to 
 
24 Carl Schurz to Andrew Johnson, 29 August 1865, The Papers of Andrew 
Johnson, edited by Leroy P. Graf and Ralph W. Haskins, Vol. 8, 671-2. Quoted in Lang, 
In the Wake of War, 204.  
25 Lemann, Redemption, 126.  
 
22 
their independence, summoning time-honored American fears of a standing army in 
peacetime.  
 White fears of black uprisings reached a fever pitch almost immediately after 
emancipation. In December of 1865, debates over land distribution revealed how, for 
black Mississippians, political rights could not be separated from armed enforcement. 
Historian Steven Hahn notes that in late 1865, “among freedpeople, rumors had been 
spreading” of “a federal plan to confiscate and redistribute the property of ex-Confederate 
landowners.”26 This rumor then sparked white rumors “of a coming race war in which 
armed ex-slaves…would rise up murderously against their old masters and seize the 
property they had expected so receive.”27 These binary rumors reveal two important 
aspects of emancipation. The first is that citizenship, here evinced in land ownership, for 
newly freedpeople existed directly in the context of armed enforcement. The second and 
more unfortunate point is that white Mississippians reacted to any armed enforcement of 
African-American rights (whether by state militia units or paramilitary companies) with 
hysteria and paranoia.  
 In Mississippi, debates over the alleged Christmas insurrections of 1865 
specifically targeted the concept of black militias. As early as October, Mississippi’s 
provisional governor William L. Sharkey wrote to the state’s Freedman’s Bureau 
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commissioner to inform him of the rumored uprising, stressing that “the black troops are 
relied on to carry out this measure” and that consequently “it is hoped the black troops 
will be speedily removed from the country.”28 Sharkey’s response reveals that the fears of 
insurrection in 1865 revolved around the increased military capability of black 
Mississippians – a direct product of the Civil War. Thus, a pattern arose wherein whites 
internalized unsubstantiated rumors of black uprisings, always in the context of armed 
resistance, and produced violent backlash.  
 In late 1865, for the first time in what would become a notorious habit, the specter 
of an African-American insurrection caused the mustering of state militia units. Governor 
Sharkey, with the approval of President Andrew Johnson, called for militia units 
“composed, as before the war, solely of white men…to guard against the threat of 
insurrection.”29 This white state militia, as those that would follow it later in the century, 
proved far more effective at disrupting than ensuring peace in the state. Federal 
investigations into several state militias’ conduct in the South revealed that “militia 
companies and armed regulators targeted freedpeople’s property as well as their persons 
– breaking into cabins, rifling through trunks, and stealing arms, money, and other 
belongings.”30 Under Presidential Reconstruction, then, the state militia became an 
aggressive arm of the state bent on the suppression of political and social rights for 
African Americans in Mississippi.   
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Like many aspects of Reconstruction, however, militias (both the state militia and 
paramilitary organizations) transformed under Congressional Reconstruction. Between 
1868 and 1875, the legality of the state militia both appealed to black Mississippians and 
drove white Mississippians to increased paramilitarism. The Union League stands at the 
head of this transition. According to historian Michael W. Fitzgerald, the Union League 
witnessed “explosive growth” in 1867 “as soon as Congress passed the Reconstruction 
Acts.”31 What began as an organization to drum up Northern support for the war became 
a secret one through which African Americans gathered to discuss and often practice 
politics. Unfortunately, during Reconstruction, armed resistance became a necessary part 
of such conversations. Fitzgerald argues that even before the uprising of the Ku Klux 
Klan in 1868, “Leaguers drilled in unofficial militias.”32 The Union League consequently 
embodied the pairing of politics and arms inseparable from the political activism of 
freedpeople.  
 However, as Radicals in Congress made violence riskier for whites in Mississippi, 
they abandoned the official state militia for an unofficial one: the Ku Klux Klan. 
Fitzgerald argues that “the Klan's growth in early 1868 had complex causes, but 
counteracting the Union League was one of its major political goals.”33 The Klan’s 
methods reveal a distinct desire to avoid federal detection and intervention. By enacting 
terror at night and covering themselves in regalia, its members could avoid identification, 
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detection, and, most importantly, retribution. Beginning such covert tactics in 1868, “the 
Klan rapidly destroyed the Union League as an effective political organization.”34 By the 
time the state legislature convened to work on the state’s new Reconstruction constitution 
in 1868, both black and white Mississippians considered armed enforcement a practical 
mechanism for enforcing the laws, and opposing paramilitary organizations stood in that 
role. However, Republican legislators soon opened new, legal avenues for African 
Americans to defend their lives and their rights.  
 While Republicans controlled the both the Presidency and Mississippi’s 
governorship, to state that Republicans or African Americans exercised complete control, 
or even majority control, over Reconstruction politics would be fallacious. Despite 
Mississippians fear of uprising in 1865, Neil R. McMillen notes that during 
Reconstruction, “There were a few black county supervisors, perhaps eight black sheriffs, 
and a small number of black chancery and circuit clerks; but no freedman held a judicial 
post above the level of justice of the peace.” Rather than an image of near-total black 
political dominance which Democrats would present to the public, “blacks never 
controlled either chamber of the state legislature.”35 Democratic fears stemmed more 
from the fact that Republicans and African Americans had increasing power (or power at 
all) rather than total power. However, Republicans made the most of their elected offices, 
beginning with the rewriting of the state’s constitution.  
 Mississippi’s Constitution of 1868 gave rise to increased public outrage rooted in 
“standing army” rhetoric. The Constitution of 1868 made the governor “Commander in 
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Chief” of the militia and gave him the exclusive “power to call forth the militia to execute 
the laws, repel invasion, and to suppress riots and insurrections.”36 White Democrats 
feared such concentrated power in the hands of a state escaping their control. To make 
matters worse, “in November [1868], Grant won the presidency and on his first day in 
office sent General Adelbert Ames to Mississippi to take over the administration of state 
government.”37 With a staunchly Republican president, a new carpetbagger governor, and 
an overwhelmingly black population, Mississippi’s Democrats saw their political 
hegemony slipping away.    
 The Constitution of 1868, named for when it was originally written, did not, 
however, get ratified until December of 1869 after Ames took control, paving the way for 
Mississippi’s reentry into the Union in February 1870. While Republicans held many 
state offices, the opposition to the new constitution and the difficulty in getting it ratified 
by voters revealed an early pattern of Republican political effort grating against an 
undercurrent of popular Democratic sentiment. Often such Democratic opposition 
revealed only a fear of African American political activity rather than any justified legal 
complaint. John Hope Franklin notes that arguments against Reconstruction Constitutions 
across the south “were the tirades of a people less concerned with the quality of 
government than with who exercised the powers of government.”38  
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Despite opposition, the new constitution passed, and the centrality of the state 
militia soon arose with the passage of a new Militia Law on July 21, 1870, further 
incensing Mississippi’s white Democrats. The Militia Law listed in minute detail every 
contingency related to the militia, including who could enlist, who was in charge, what 
duties were reserved for whom, how the militia would be funded, and how much men 
would be paid for their service. This strict description and layout of the militia, viewed in 
context of the paramilitary battles of the late 1860s, reveals a deep desire to strictly define 
legal and extralegal violence in the state, a line that had grown ever blurrier since 
emancipation. The increased power of the governor under the new constitution 
underscores the move toward clarifying what forces counted as state militia. Section 37 
gave the governor “full power to order into active service the Militia force of the 
State…to suppress riot, insurrection or to aid the civil officers in the execution of the 
laws or on account of any sudden emergency not embraced in this clause.”39 This 
reworded statement of the governor’s sole power over the militia particularly alarmed 
Democrats. However, the clauses of both the Constitution of 1868 and the Militia Law of 
1870 which permitted militia use “to suppress riot and insurrection” would come to 
define the next two decades. 
 The open wording of the law (“any sudden emergency not embraced in this 
clause”) and its direct implication that the Republican governor of the day, James Alcorn 
(elected following Mississippi’s readmission to the Union and removal of Ames as 
military governor), could legally employ the militia for any purpose outraged white 
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Mississippians. Many saw it as an affront to their liberty. In willful ignorance of both the 
recent Civil War and the perpetual violence in Mississippi, the Weekly Commercial 
Herald of Vicksburg responded by calling the militia a “sedentary militia,” claiming that 
“There is no state in the Union in which militia is required,” and finally that there was 
“less necessity for it in the Southern states than in any other in the Union.”40 The use of 
the term “sedentary militia” invokes the fear of a standing army ingrained in the 
American experience, particularly that of the south after the occupation of the Civil War. 
Andrew F. Lang notes that southerners were not the only ones distrustful of peacetime 
militias, claiming that “African American soldiers, white northern moderates claimed, 
embodied the alarming chaotic nature of a standing army.”41 However, while 
Republicans in Mississippi by 1870 held control of the state capitol and a legislated 
militia to reinforce it, white Democrats harbored resentment bent on violence, while 
white northerners grew increasingly apathetic.  
 Mississippians in 1871 nonetheless clung to their extralegal paramilitary groups 
for defense, but a riot in Meridian soon proved to the state’s Republicans that an 
organized force would be required to ensure peace. By 1871, hostilities remained 
between former Union League members and the Ku Klux Klan. In March of 1871, white 
activist Daniel Price arrived in Meridian “and wrote back to his former League comrades 
that conditions were better across the Mississippi line. Several hundred freedmen joined 
him, deserting labor contracts in the process.”42 After a massive fire struck the city, racial 
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animosities flared over who to blame. At the trial of suspected arsonists (all prominent 
black leaders in the community) shooting broke out in the courthouse, soon devolving 
into a large skirmish between local Union Leaguers and Ku Klux Klan members. The 
outbreak killed an estimated thirty black Mississippians and the white judge of the trial.43 
Union League members applied to Governor Alcorn for assistance specifically so “that 
they might put a stop to Ku Klux outrages,” yet the governor “gave them no 
satisfaction.”44 Despite the new constitution, paramilitary militias rather than state units 
prevailed. Republican officeholders such as Alcorn, however, felt no immediate 
insecurity and thus no need to formalize the relationship between violence and state law 
in practice; however, as the 1870s wore on, the need became strikingly apparent.  
 Though Adelbert Ames originally came to Mississippi on President Grant’s 
orders, he won Mississippi’s gubernatorial election in 1873 with strong Republican and 
African American support, and he would need the full power of the law to wield the state 
militia. Otis A. Singletary notes that immediately after Ames’s election in 1873, “The 
tempo of violence increased throughout the state, and Negro militia forces were called 
upon to play a more dominant role in political affairs.”45 Violent outbreaks occurred 
throughout the state (always tied to politics), the most violent of which were in Vicksburg 
and Clinton, while Yazoo City trailed close behind. While each of these instances 
affected the political and social temper of the state, a state-sponsored militia only 
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appeared at Clinton. Thus, a minute description of each instance is not here warranted, 
yet some important details on the development of the black militia as a means of 
preservation for the Republican Party may be drawn from each instance. 46 
 On July 4, 1863, General Ulysses S. Grant captured the city of Vicksburg in one 
of his most illustrious achievements of the Civil War. On July 4, 1874, President of the 
United States Ulysses S. Grant faced the decision to send federal troops back to 
Vicksburg, where bloodshed yet again occurred. Lemann succinctly summarizes the 
situation: “At a July 4 celebration held by Negro Republicans…a group of whites with 
guns turned up and started shooting.”47 Rampant violence followed, driving many 
African Americans from their homes to Jackson, where they implored Governor Ames 
for assistance. Ames, however, “tried to get troops, but the President [refused].”48 The 
election on August 5 consequently “brought a sweeping Democratic victory in 
Vicksburg.”49  
By petitioning Grant, Governor Ames revealed a deep uneasiness with wielding the 
state militia and displayed a reservation contrary to Democratic newspapers’ portrayal of 
him as a dangerous demagogue. Future Democratic violence and caricatures of Ames 
would regularly ignore such obvious distaste for organizing a military force. Ames’s 
reluctance consequently plagued both himself and Mississippi’s African Americans 
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throughout his term, while still failing to prevent the violence he feared. Furthermore, 
Grant’s refusal to intervene in Mississippi’s violent politics did not bode well for Ames 
and the Republican Party, shifting the burden of providing militarized protection for 
African Americans solely to the governor. Ames, with clear constitutional and 
presidential authority, still refused to deploy African American militia. However, when 
violence in Vicksburg only increased, militarized force became a much more attractive 
option for keeping order.  
In November 1874, members of Vicksburg’s municipal government, including circuit 
clerk C.W. Cordoza, his successor A.W. Dorsey, chancery clerk George W. Davenport, 
and sheriff Peter Crosby (also in charge of collecting taxes) faced charges of financial 
and political corruption. As the New York Times put it, the officials were “defying the 
laws of the State and prostituting their offices to their private ends.”50 Local whites then 
violently removed them (physically and metaphorically) from office, causing the former 
officeholders to flee to Jackson for sanctuary. White Democrats in Vicksburg thereby 
rerouted their attack on the Republicans in the city by changing their rhetoric. They 
established “Taxpayers’ Leagues” to imply that Republicans “had failed to take the 
measures required by law for the protection of the people” and “grossly misused 
taxpayers’ money.” 51  The changing of titles, however, stemmed not from a true 
grievance over taxes, but out of a carefully planned avoidance of the Ku Klux Klan Act 
of 1871 that might spark federal intervention. Years after, Ames highlighted the absence 
of true financial grievance by reflecting that “there was no ‘corruption’ as the statistics 
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prove,” but that “even corruption could not justify the taking of human life.”52 As 
Democratic violence became more complicated, Ames’s sense of control diminished 
further, and his methods became more desperate.  
 By the time Vicksburg’s Republicans fell under siege in 1874, Ames had already 
expressed his fear of mustering an African American militia, yet he also realized that as 
“the state government commanded the respect of the colored race only, it must depend 
for military support on colored troops.”53 However, control slipping, Ames decided that a 
show of force might reduce the growing Democratic threat. Thus, Ames sent Peter 
Crosby, who had fled Vicksburg to seek protection from the governor in Jackson, “back 
to Vicksburg with instructions to assemble a posse comitatus – a temporary militia” 
which “would surely be made up entirely of Negroes.”54 Though this does not constitute 
the deployment of the state militia, it indicates the willingness, first evinced after 
emancipation, of black Mississippians to protect themselves in militia units. The 
Vicksburg militia further reveals that by late 1874 Ames began to see a civilian 
militarized force as the only way to maintain Republican officeholders, believing that an 
African American force would be the only one willing to sustain his party. Governor 
Ames then struggled with the conundrum which would haunt the rest of his 
administration: which citizens to call upon? Lemann asks, “if they were white troops, 
would they agree to carry out his orders, and if they were black troops, would they do 
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more harm than good in the aggregate if they wound up killing whites?”55 Vicksburg’s 
results proved far from encouraging. 
From the outset, “the blacks were poorly armed” and “seem to have intended no more 
than a show of force and not, as whites would claim, an attack on the city.”56 The 
importance of the black militia as a “show of force” summarizes what happened in 
Vicksburg, and what would happen later in other regions of the state. The black “posse 
comitatus” at Vicksburg intended to display Republican and African American political 
courage and a resolve not to back down to white intimidation. When Crosby’s militia 
arrived at Vicksburg, they decided not to fight, yet on their peaceful retreat a group of 
armed whites from Vicksburg and the surrounding areas opened fire. The New York 
Times “estimated that from fifty to one hundred Negroes were killed, and about thirty 
more captured.”57  This quote accurately captures the irony of white paramilitarism. 
While Democratic newspapers hurled insults at the unconstitutionality of a state militia in 
“peacetime,” they simultaneously practiced the “capturing” of prisoners of war. Thus, the 
first effort at organizing African American citizens to, symbolically or physically, combat 
white Democratic violence failed. Ames did not, however, give up on the militia as an 
viable show of force. 
While indiscriminate violence against African Americans in Mississippi never 
stopped in the immediate aftermath of Vicksburg, federal involvement momentarily 
slowed it. A desperate Governor Ames convened an emergency legislature in December 
 
55 Lemann, Redemption, 84.  
56 Whitley, “Precious Memories”, 72.  
57 “The Vicksburg Troubles,” The New York Times, December 13, 1874.  
 
22 
to once again petition President Grant for troops. This time, he was more successful. 
Grant authorized the use of federal troops in Mississippi and Louisiana (where violence 
against blacks and Republicans had also increased) while a committee investigated the 
Vicksburg troubles.58 During this period of federal intervention, the paramilitary White 
League and White Line organizations were far less active, particularly in the public eye. 
William C. Harris has noted that “white-line sentiment emerged in inverse relationship to 
the potential for federal intervention.”59 Democrats wanted to pour on as much pressure 
through violence as possible, yet they realized that if the federal government examined 
the situation too closely, then a much larger, more organized, and better funded military 
force would reenter the state. The state militia was a far more manageable threat to the 
Democratic mind than the United States Army. Though white paramilitary groups 
claimed to be bravely and courageously fighting for their honor and rights, there is a stark 
lack of confrontation when an equally well-equipped armed force arose to meet them. 
 Throughout 1875, political tensions in Mississippi only heightened. However, in 
the months leading up to the November 5 election, Democratic political violence 
increased to the point of leaving the state militia as the only preservative option left to 
Republicans. On September 4, 1875, black Republicans scheduled a barbecue to boost 
morale for the upcoming election and to allow politicians to speak in front of a crowd 
estimated between 1,500 to 2,500 people.60 Lemann notes that “To see, or even to think 
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about a Negro militia sent whites into a frenzy of anticipatory violence,” so one can 
imagine the effect of seeing none other than “Oliver Cromwell,” who paraded at the head 
of an all-black militia unit while he “wore a plumed hat and cavalry saber and sat astride 
a horse trimmed in red, white, and blue ribbons.”61 The memory of Vicksburg, the 
increasing proximity to the election, the presence of a militarized African American 
force, and the weakening of federal intervention created an atmosphere at Clinton poised 
for violence.   
 After the barbecue and parade, speakers took the stage. While such barbecues and 
political rallies happened regularly, in an unusual move for a political rally of any kind in 
Reconstruction Mississippi, it is clear by all accounts that “an invitation was extended to 
all persons to attend” so that there could then “be a joint discussion.”62 Though there 
were many times more African Americans and Republicans at Clinton on September 4, 
there were, by invitation, a small group of white Democrats who would be allowed to 
speak. However, the Raymond Gazette proposed in early August that:  
whenever a Radical pow-wow is to be held, the nearest anti-Radical club appoint 
a committee of ten discreet, intelligent, and reputable citizens…to attend as 
representatives of the taxpayers of the neighborhood and the county and true 
friends of the Negroes assembled; and that whenever the Radical speakers 
proceed to mislead the negroes…that the committee stop them right then and 
there and compel them to tell the truth or quit the stand.63 
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The Democrats of Clinton who attended the rally complied. To make matters worse, 
many in the crowd, both black and white, observed what Melinda Meek Hennessy 
describes as “the customary Southern male habit of always carrying a pistol.”64  
The first speaker, Democratic Judge Frank Johnston spoke for roughly an hour 
without incident, yet when Republican speaker H. T. Fisher, a stand-in for Adelbert 
Ames, began speaking, he was interrupted when within “about five minutes someone 
called the speaker a liar.”65 The Raymond Gazette’s orders had been followed. Though no 
one afterward could specifically identify who shouted at Fisher, tempers flared in the 
crowd. Later accounts point to a group of white men on the outer edge of the crowd 
sharing a bottle of whiskey (which was prohibited at the event) as the source of the 
violence. Charles Caldwell, a former slave, blacksmith, senator, and well-respected 
citizen in both the white and black communities, confronted the group of white men, 
begging them not to disturb the gathering. Soon after, however, Caldwell claimed to have 
personally seen Frank Thompson, a white man, fire the first shot. 66 Chaos ensued. Shots 
rang out from both sides, while both whites and blacks fled the scene in fear. When the 
smoke cleared on the day of the riot, “fatalities that day numbered three white men and at 
least five blacks, two of whom were children.”67 The African Americans fled to the 
countryside, while the whites sent for reinforcements from surrounding towns to continue 
the fight.68 
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While the violence at the barbecue was bad, incendiary newspaper coverage made 
the fallout far worse. White Line paramilitary groups both from Mississippi and from 
nearby Louisiana flooded into Hinds County and began indiscriminately terrorizing and 
killing numerous African Americans, who fled en masse to Jackson to beg for Governor 
Ames’s help. 69 Fearing the political consequences of a display of force this close to the 
election, Ames petitioned President Grant for military support. This time, Grant refused. 
The president infamously stated to Attorney General Edwards Pierrepont that “the whole 
public are tired out with these annual, autumnal outbreaks in the South” and that “the 
great majority are ready now to condemn any interference on the part of the 
government.”70 Grant’s statement embodies the near total indifference of both the federal 
government and white northerners to Mississippi’s increasingly frequent atrocities. Grant 
thereby placed the power to preserve Mississippi’s Republicans and African Americans 
once again in the sole hands of Governor Ames, who finally saw the militia as his last 
hope.  
Ames again encountered the problem that “no white Republicans could be found 
who would form a militia to oppose members of their own race, and forming a black 
militia was perilous in the extreme, calling forth the centuries-old and never entirely 
absent fear of and uprising by the majority race.”71 However, left with few other options, 
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Ames mustered units from those African Americans who had fled to Jackson from 
Clinton. By late September, Ames revived a bill, passed the year before in the wake of 
Vicksburg, that appropriated $60,000 for the organization of the state militia, making 
$5,000 immediately available to outfit two regiments. However, Democrats in the 
legislature immediately passed a motion to prevent Ames from capitalizing on the 
funds.72 Despite this, Ames wrote to his wife Blanche Butler Ames on September 23 that 
he had “begun to organize colored militia” and, on September 27, that he “had a thousand 
muskets arrive.”73 Abandoned by the federal government and distrustful of his own state 
legislature, Ames finally asserted his right as governor to wield the militia.  
 African American attitudes toward the militia should have reassured Ames in his 
actions. Many African Americans expressed far fewer apprehensions to joining the 
militia than Governor Ames had in enlisting them. Abraham Burriss, a young African 
American man, expressed a willingness to join the militia, asking Ames only for 
weapons. Burriss noted that “we are all have sign our name to the malitia role, and only o 
wante armes…give us guns and we will show the scondrels that the colored people will 
fight.”74 Black Mississippians proved in the immediate aftermath of emancipation and 
within the Union League that they were willing to bear arms to protect themselves and 
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their rights within extralegal militia companies, so the attraction to a legal militia is 
unsurprising. However, participating in the state-sanctioned militia required the hard to 
win permission of Governor Ames.  
After Ames’s militia appropriations bill, African American militia units became 
“all the talk” in the state, while exaggerated white fears of a militant, overwhelming black 
force grew worse than ever. 75  However, despite the reassurance of men like Abraham 
Burriss that African Americans would fight, Ames wrote his wife Blanche Butler Ames 
on October 4 that he was “convinced that my Negro militia has not the courage or nerve - 
whatever it may be called - to act the part of soldiers.”76 Regardless, Governor Ames 
finally mobilized a militia unit on October 9. Charles Caldwell, a leading figure of the 
Clinton Riot, marched thirty-two miles to nearby Edwards Station leading two companies 
of 190 men to deliver guns. The militia units, in full military dress, marched to Edwards 
Station and back to Jackson undisturbed.77 Though it delivered arms, the militia that 
traveled to Edwards Station predictably served a largely symbolic purpose. By mustering 
and then using the militia, Ames proved that he was willing to manifest whites’ worst 
fear, the African American militia, to preserve peace, political equality, and his own 
office. Furthermore, the militia’s symbolism extended in that, while prepared to, it did no 
fighting. Whenever an armed African American militia prepared for a fair fight, 
paramilitary White Line groups again stood down. As Blanche Ames aptly predicted 
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earlier in September, “Bullies are always cowards when approached with courage and 
determination.”78 
Though White Line groups did not attack Caldwell’s militia, the symbol of armed 
black men in military uniform outraged Democrats, who took to the papers to vent their 
fears and stoke public anger toward the black companies. One prevalent aspect of the 
coverage was the portrayal of Charles Caldwell, who, though lauded in many earlier 
papers from both parties as the one trying to quell the unrest at Clinton, had by October 
16 become, according to the Canton Mail, “one of the instigators of the riot.”79 
Caldwell’s portrayal as an instigator rather than peacekeeper in the riot highlights both 
the untrustworthiness of some Democratic newspaper coverage as well as an effort, to be 
repeated in other riots, of undermining African American political organization by 
highlighting criminality and riotousness amongst African American leaders.  
Adelbert Ames also predictably came under fire. The Daily Mississippi Pilot 
included an October 14 article entitled “Notes on and of the Sounding Preparations for 
War” arguing that Ames’s actions were “violating the Constitution of the State and the 
United States in raising, equipping and maintaining a standing army in time of peace.”80 
Democrats again attempted to undercut Ames by making him appear incompetent, 
although Ames’s mustering of the militia was within the realms of his power as granted 
by Mississippi’s Constitution of 1868. Furthermore, Ames was “ordered to assemble it by 
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the president of the United States.”81 If anything, the decision to utilize the militia in 
1875, when he had permission since the previous year, could be read as charitable rather 
than dictatorial.  
The successful march to Edwards Station signaled one of the only active 
movements the militia made under Governor Ames. However, after the success of the 
Edwards Station march, rumors abounded that Ames would use the militia again to 
reinstate the displaced sheriff of Yazoo City, A. T. Morgan, who had been deposed by a 
white mob a few weeks prior. However, on October 13, 1875, a peace conference was 
held between Ames and leading Democrats, arbitrated by a New Yorker named George 
K. Chase. Both parties agreed that “Ames would promise not to send Charles Caldwell, 
Albert Morgan, and the Negro militia to Yazoo City…and the white citizens would 
promise to ensure that the quickly approaching election be free and fair.”82 Ames, hoping 
to avoid more bloodshed, possibly thought that his show of force succeeded and would 
no longer be needed for African Americans to politically sustain the Republican Party in 
Jackson. However, a later congressional report aptly concluded that “The stipulation on 
the part of the governor was faithfully kept, but the promise made by General George was 
systematically disregarded by the democrats in the larger portion of the State.”83 
As soon as word of the conference got out, The Clarion Ledger on October 20 
stated that Morgan “has declined to avail himself of the escort of negro militia into Yazoo 
County,” but that if the militia had been mustered, “The invasion of Yazoo county by a 
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lawless pretended militia, armed to the teeth, would be such a trespass as will justify the 
citizens of the county in repelling for the protection of their lives, their property, and their 
sacred altars.”84 The Edwards Station and Yazoo incidents display a tendency of the 
Democratic and White Line organizations to only commit violence when an organized 
oppositional force cannot be found. Consequently, when Ames agreed to disband the 
militia, that paved the way for the loosely veiled threat of violence underpinning the 
Clarion Ledger’s statement.   
Violence by no means ceased after the peace conference, and whites no longer 
feared the armed opposition. Eruptions of particularly bad violence occurred in places 
like Friars Point, Mississippi and Port Gibson, Mississippi, or as Leman generalizes “in 
the parts of Mississippi that had the heaviest black population majorities.”85 Therefore, 
Democratic suppression of Republican, and therefore black, votes continued unabated, 
while Ames’s state militia, up to that point the only instrument left by which the 
Republicans could attempt to maintain power, was nowhere to be seen.  
With the threats of both federal intervention and the state militia out of the way, 
the Democrats swept the elections of November 5. Eric Foner explains, however, that 
“blacks remained steadfast; indeed, in some plantation counties, the Republican vote 
actually increased. But where violence had devastated the [Republican] party’s 
infrastructure and blacks ‘feared for their lives’ if they presented themselves at the polls, 
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the returns constituted a political revolution.”86 Consequently, as Singletary puts it, “The 
election of 1875, which marked the return to power of the Democrats in Mississippi, 
marked the end of Negro militia in that state.”87 The new Democratic Governor John 
Stone would not need to employ militia units.  
While Adelbert Ames sought to preserve the ever-tenuous Republican hold on 
politics in Reconstruction Mississippi with state militia, his efforts at organizing and 
utilizing those predominantly black militia units failed to prevent Democratic takeover. In 
discussing federal occupation of the South during Reconstruction, William H. Emory 
noted in 1877 that “the presence of troops has not preserved the Republican party.”88 
State militias likewise failed. However, the militia and the decision on whether or not to 
use it was certainly not the only reason for the Republicans’ losses at the polls, as 
William Bland Whitley notes that there was much division, conflicting interests, and 
infighting within the party.89 However, the use of militia by Ames and the attitudes of 
citizens toward it reveal important characteristics of and changes to the state of 
Mississippi as it progressed into the late nineteenth century.  
First, the militia’s importance to the governor increased. During Reconstruction, 
Mississippi’s Constitution of 1868 and its later Militia Law of 1870 gave the governor 
authority to use the militia at his bidding. Though Ames failed to sustain Republican 
politics in the state by using the militia, the very attempt created a shift in how the 
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governor could operate in the future and expanded both the executive and military arms 
of the state. While white citizens of Mississippi came to view the militia unfavorably, in 
the next decade the Democratic Party would manipulate the powers given to Governor 
Ames, but for the oppression rather than protection of African Americans. In another 
irony of Mississippi’s Reconstruction, later Democrats owed the Republican engineered 
Constitution of 1868 for the militia power they would eventually wield.  
At the citizen level, white and black Mississippians alike focused heavily on the 
militia in the turmoil of the mid-1870s. White Mississippians, still reeling from the 
occupation of the Civil War, grew to hate the state militia even more when Governor 
Ames mustered predominantly African American units in 1875. White citizens thought of 
black militias as “a presence galling during the war, and even more infuriating during 
peace.”90 After the creation of black militia units following the Vicksburg and Clinton 
riots, the newly reinstated Democratic majority would shy away from citizen soldiering 
in the future, associating the state militia, white or black, with an unconstitutional 
standing army.  
To further complicate the narrative, several white Mississippi natives also joined 
Ames’s state militia. By September 25, 1875, after the legislature approved the Militia 
Appropriations Bill, the staunchly Republican Weekly Mississippi Pilot noted that 
“seventy-one white citizens were enrolled, and sixty-three of that number were at once 
mustered into service with the usual forms.”91 These whites could potentially have been 
Democrats enrolling to thwart the creation of a black-dominated militia force, but it is 
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unlikely, as whites had military forces of their own. Furthermore, John Hope Franklin, in 
his seminal work on Reconstruction, notes that “whites were used…not merely as 
officers but as enlisted men when they could be trusted and could be induced to join in 
the task of supporting and protecting the Radical governments.”92 Thus, a portion of 
Mississippi’s whites opposed Democratic violence enough to enlist in the state militia, 
though they would in practice serve little purpose.   
African Americans in Reconstruction viewed both state and informal militias as 
legitimate means to protect themselves and enforce their newly won rights. The political 
nature of the state militia here is important. As the militia attempted to maintain 
Republican Party control in the state capitol, it also provided a driving force for political 
activism within the African American community. The African American militia 
movement in Reconstruction, particularly in Mississippi, was a way that African 
Americans could legally protect their rights and “fill critical voids left by an increasingly 
ambivalent and hamstrung United States Army in the wake of Military Reconstruction.”93 
As Republicans in the North and in the federal government grew jaded with the violence 
of the south, black southerners turned to the militia as the only legitimate way to protect 
themselves against lawless white violence. When the Democratic Party swept the 1875 
elections, African Americans’ dreams of ensuring their rights through the state militia 
were likewise swept away.  
The events in Mississippi in 1875 show that had black militiamen been able to 
perform the duties they so desired, they might have successfully warded off much of the 
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political intimidation they faced. Wherever armed and ready militia units appeared, white 
paramilitary groups disappeared. African Americans, as shown above in Abraham 
Burriss’s letter, were willing and ready to fight. Singletary blames Ames for his reticence, 
asserting that “No one can say what the results might have been if Ames had been willing 
to use, rather than merely organize, his Negro troops…The governor should never have 
organized them unless he intended to put them to use, because from the moment 
mobilization began, they became targets for a well-armed enemy.”94 Black people in 
Mississippi stood ready to defend themselves, yet in contrast to white paramilitary 
groups, they relied on the legal sanction of the governor as well as the arms the state 
could provide. 
Governor Ames’s position cannot be taken lightly. While it is easy to blame him, 
one must also consider the precariousness of his position. The threat of a race war, or 
even a second civil war, never quite left the south. Ames noted only three days after the 
Clinton Riot that “in '60 and '61 there were not such unity and such preparation against 
the government of the U. S. as now exist against the colored men and the government 
their votes have established.”95 However, Ames had the backing of the federal 
government in using the militia. A congressional committee, led by Senator George 
Boutwell, later investigated the violence concerning the Mississippi election of 1875 and 
whether a fair election was conducted. In the report, the committee noted that "it was the 
duty of the governor to use the militia for the suppression of such riots as those of 
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Vicksburgh and Clinton, and this without regard to the question whether the white or the 
black race was most responsible therefor."96 Though Ames had full permission from the 
federal government to employ the state militia, he chose timid displays to avoid further 
violence which could have easily reached the governor’s mansion. Interestingly, Ames’s 
conduct also mimicked that of other Reconstruction Governors in the south. John Hope 
Franklin notes that "In Florida a militia was organized and armed in June 1868, although 
it was never used. Governor Brownlow of Tennessee also organized a militia that served 
more as a warning to his enemies than as an actual fighting force."97 Ames’s application 
of the state militia as a threat rather than a fighting force thereby ignored the failures of 
other governors who tried the same tactics years before. However, the threat of reigniting 
the Civil War alone cannot explain Ames’s failure to learn from his contemporaries.  
 Governor Ames’s failure to effectively utilize the state militia also stemmed from 
a less studied cause. Aside from his reluctance to start a race war, Ames gradually shifted 
toward personal racism as violence increased and the election approached. Ames’s letters 
to Blanche reveal the shift toward blatant, unjustified racism. While on September 23, he 
noted that he would “continue till the last man of our side is in the ranks,” by October 4 
he was “convinced that my Negro militia has not the courage or nerve - whatever it may 
be called - to act the part of soldiers.” 98 In eleven days, and without having tested a 
single unit, pressure caused Ames to turn against the African Americans who were ready 
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to fight for themselves. Less than two weeks later, Ames shifted further toward blaming 
the African Americans for being killed without being allowed, by Ames himself, to 
legally defend themselves. The governor noted on October 12 after the successful march 
to Edwards Station that “it is [African Americans’] fault (not mine, personally) that this 
fate is before them. They refused to prepare for war when in time of peace, when they 
could have done so. Now it is too late.”99 Therefore, a growing racism and resentment 
toward the African Americans looking for protection hindered the mobilization of the 
state militia as much as Ames’s own apprehension to use force.  
His subtle shift toward racism made the decision to resign even easier when “in 
February [1876], a legislative committee produced a thirteen-count bill of impeachment 
against Ames.”100 Ames had fought constantly against violence and suppression in 
Mississippi, yet he was left with only impeachment to show for it. In one last bid to 
preserve his reputation for a potential future in the Senate, “on March 28, he made a deal 
with the Mississippi legislature: he would resign as governor if the impeachment charges 
against him were dropped.”101 Ames tired of fighting for a cause which both wearied him 
and produced little meaningful impact, finally gave up. While political maneuvering 
offers one explanation for his resignation, his frustration with the affairs of Mississippi 
and his failing faith in the African Americans therein can hardly be discounted as 
influential to his decision.  
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 While in office, though, Ames established a pattern of state militia usage which 
would endure. During Reconstruction, legislation and necessity placed the state militia at 
the center of focus in Mississippi. Ames’s use of the militia, particularly in mustering all-
black units, created an apprehension toward the militia as the Democrats retook power. 
As a new decade approached, however, the militia would again be used as a symbol in 
Mississippi to “suppress riots and insurrections” for which events at Meridian, 
Vicksburg, and Clinton proved a need. Similarly, white militias would, in practice, 
almost never do any real fighting. As Ames had attempted to use the militia to preserve 
Republican political power in Mississippi, Democratic Governor Robert Lowry would do 
the same when challenges to his control arose. As the state moved forward into the 
1880s, the state militia’s constituency and goals reversed, while its core practices 
remained the same.  
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Chapter II  
In 1880, a census enumerator listed thirty-five-year-old Oliver Cromwell as an 
illiterate farmer in Wilkinson County, Mississippi, married to Tennessee Cromwell.102 
Despite his illiteracy, by the late 1880s Cromwell politically organized other African 
American farmers in the Mississippi Delta, achieving enough success to spark a 
bloodbath known as the Leflore County Massacre. While Cromwell was not the primary 
instigator of the Clinton Riot of 1875, he stood at the forefront of the Leflore County 
Massacre of 1889, pitting him against Mississippi’s state militia (of which he was once a 
part) and leading ultimately to his exile. Cromwell’s experience, as explored in the last 
chapter, continued to embody the changing racial, economic, and political status of 
African Americans in Mississippi while highlighting the reinvented goals of the state 
militia.  
 After the violent so-called “Redemption” of Mississippi in 1875, the state militia 
dwindled in importance compared to its primary role in Reconstruction. Beginning 
January 26, 1876, the state legislature repealed Adelbert Ames’s amendments to the 
Militia Law of 1870 that had appropriated funds to the militia and mustered it into 
companies.103 The Constitution of 1868 maintained the state militia as an organization, 
yet this new act stripped it of the resources that would make it useful. To further prevent 
a militia revival, on February 24, 1876, the legislature amended the Militia Law of 1870 
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to reduce “The pay of the militia when in active service” to “five cents per day, for 
officers and soldiers.”104 These acts dramatically underfunded the state militia to make it 
unappealing to citizens who might join, deplete its resources if mustered, and limit a form 
of political patronage to keep the poorest Mississippians from exercising leadership in the 
militia.  
 Democratic Governor John M. Stone publicly upheld Mississippi’s abandonment 
of the state militia only a year later. In Kemper County, Mississippi in 1877, Democratic 
leader John Gully was murdered. While a black man was arrested for the crime, 
Republican rival W. W. Chisolm was imprisoned for alleged conspiracy. After Chisolm’s 
arrest, a mob of armed men arrived at the jail seeking vigilante justice. Chisolm’s 
supporters soon arrived with arms of their own, and the ensuing battle left six dead. 105 As 
historian Stephen Cresswell explains, Chisolm’s widow applied to Governor Stone for 
militia assistance to quell the violence, but Stone, recognizing that sending in the militia 
might reveal insecurity in the Democratic Party, refused.106 The importance of this 
bloody incident lies in Governor Stone’s direct refusal to mobilize the state militia. 
Sending in the militia would have revealed that political tension in Mississippi remained 
strong enough to justify force. By ignoring the incident, Stone minimalized the 
Republican sentiment that led to the bloodshed, and reassured Mississippians that the 
state militia of Reconstruction would no longer be a threat. If any white Democrats 
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needed further reassurance, they would receive it from the federal government the next 
year.  
In 1878, the federal government revealed its own growing apprehension toward 
military involvement in individual states by passing the Posse Comitatus Act. Historian 
Andrew Lang explains that “the act prohibited the army from enforcing the law and 
regulating civil affairs unless approved by the US Constitution or prescribed by an act of 
Congress. State militias…would instead assume these responsibilities.”107 Mississippi 
thereby received the permission to handle its affairs as it pleased, unbothered by the 
threat of federal intervention. The weight of peacekeeping rested on the state militia, but 
the legislature had already successfully dismantled it.  
 Although the Posse Comitatus Act on the federal level made the state militia the 
sole body of enforcement for all the states, Mississippi’s legislators chose to keep theirs 
weak. There are a few reasons explain the decision to effectively dismantle the state 
militia. The first explanation is financial. Historian Dorothy Pratt notes that following 
Reconstruction, Mississippi’s state officials focused primarily on the state’s finances.108 
Indebtedness plagued Mississippi for a variety of reasons after the Civil War and 
Reconstruction, so the militia, a subliminal, as-needed force to begin with, was an easy 
target for slashed funding. However, racial power dynamics and the experience of 
Reconstruction contributed to the ease with which state leaders could dispense with the 
militia.  
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 Furthermore, in the middle and late 1860s, whites created their own paramilitary 
militias. Cresswell notes that “white military or paramilitary action to put down so-called 
race riots…served notice on the black community that proud and independent behavior 
would not be tolerated.”109 White Mississippians recognized their ability to form 
paramilitary groups without fear of legal ramifications. They therefore preferred those 
organizations to the state militia because they could reserve them exclusively to whites, 
whereas the law prevented direct exclusion of African Americans from the state militia. 
For example, one Mississippian captured the common nineteenth-century portrayal of the 
Ku Klux Klan as “organized for the protection of the defenseless, the preservation of law 
and order, and the traditions of the South,” a characterization that continued into the late-
twentieth century.110  Beginning in the 1870s, then, paramilitary groups circumvented the 
state militia, performing the same duties without fear of black participation. The 
weakening of the state militia in the middle and late 1870s thereby reinforced the strength 
of groups like the KKK and the white supremacy they were founded upon.  
 Though confident enough to neglect the state militia, the Democratic Party could 
never be entirely comfortable with their success. As in Reconstruction, Redemption 
politics were not black and white. While the Democratic Party wielded large influence in 
state politics, the Redemption era was “a contentious time when Republicans continued 
to share power and a variety of political parties challenged the Bourbons…for control of 
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state and local government.”111 The Democratic Party, though entirely white, failed to 
monopolize the white vote in the 1880s. Historian C. Vann Woodward notes that despite 
its name, “the organization and control of the party was anything but 
democratic…everything was the private business of a few politicians known by the 
discontented as the ‘ring’ or the ‘courthouse clique.’”112 Discontentment produced by the 
hierarchical and elitist Democratic Party pushed marginal whites, particularly low-
income farmers, to cooperate with African Americans in Mississippi in a process known 
as fusion or fusionism. Historian Edward Ayers notes that “The early 1880s witnessed 
many attempts at cooperation and fusion among Republicans and independents.”113 
While white Democrats mistrusted cooperation between Mississippi’s politically 
disempowered in the late 1870s and early 1880s, such cooperation would spark a 
renewed interest in the state militia by the middle of the decade.   
 Growing demographic changes produced further insecurities for the Democratic 
Party. The African American population in Mississippi skyrocketed in the 1880s, giving 
the Democratic Party further cause for concern. Ayers notes that “communities in 
Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia watched as huge crowds of local blacks gathered at 
railroad stations to await transportation to [jobs in] the Mississippi Delta, the Louisiana 
rice or sugar fields, or the turpentine camps of the piney woods.”114 As the planter class 
declined in the 1880s, and as the South industrialized, African Americans flooded to the 
fertile soil of the Mississippi Delta and the burgeoning lumber industries of the Piney 
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Woods to seek economic opportunities. This influx of African Americans into 
Mississippi coincided with a loss of native whites. Though race might have contributed to 
some whites’ departure, economic opportunities and the decreasing availability of land in 
the south led many whites, who had the financial means to do so, to seek better fortunes 
in the west. Ayers also notes that “while the thirteen Southern states saw a net loss of 
537,000 blacks between 1880 and 1910, the loss of whites totaled 1,243,000 in those 
same decades.”115 Specifically, counties in Mississippi experienced an average black 
population growth of 91 percent in that same date range.116 Whites in Mississippi never 
boasted a population majority, yet they were being even further outstripped in the 1880s. 
Strict democratic process, then, did not favor the Democratic Party.  
 Many of the African Americans moving either to the south or to different regions 
of the south did so for economic reasons, but they would not be politically silent when 
they got there. Historian Omar H. Ali explains that in the mid-1880s, “African Americans 
born in the decade before the Civil War who were old enough to have experienced the 
promise of Emancipation and the collapse of Reconstruction began to create local 
organizations in order to foster solidarity and economic cooperation within their 
communities.”117 These men, like Oliver Cromwell, rose to prominence by emphasizing 
the benefits of unity among rural African Americans in the south. These men openly 
challenged the Democratic Party, despite the violence they faced. Ali states that 
“southern African Americans in the post-Reconstruction era were not only actively 
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organizing against (not simply victims of) Democratic rule but developed their own lines 
of independent black political organizing.”118 Consequently, even if the Republican Party 
in Mississippi lost much of its functionality with the Election of 1875, a trend toward 
independent, third party organizing developed in its wake. In an ironic turn, then, African 
Americans became more politically unified and autonomous after the antagonistic 
Democratic Party recaptured the state capitol. Unfortunately, this autonomy predictably 
sparked violent backlash from white Democrats.  
 The Election of 1881 in Mississippi offered the first resuscitation of a familiar 
pattern of violence, politics, and race, starting the process by which the militia would 
again rise to prominence. Ali notes that “the specter of 'Black Republicanism' had loomed 
large in the consciousness of Mississippi Democrats throughout the summer and fall of 
1881,” which manifested violently in the state election that November.119 Black and 
white citizens of Meridian unified under fusion candidates in the months leading up to the 
election, sowing seeds of anxiety within the Democratic community. Consequently, “a 
sheriff’s posse in Meridian…gathered as a show of force to intimidate fusion voters,” but 
they were “soon matched by the same number of African Americans who came to protect 
fusion voters.”120 To white Democrats, this display of black solidarity and white political 
support for it created an explosive atmosphere.  
The Marion voting precinct, just north of Meridian, saw the bloodiest violence. The 
Salt Lake Daily Herald from Salt Lake City, Utah, maintained that at the Marion voting 
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precinct on November 8, 1881, a white man named Joseph Barrett was insulted by an 
African American man. Barrett then turned to strike him with a cane, but “before he 
could strike, another negro, Frank Johnson, shot him in the neck.”121 Violence erupted at 
the precinct, leaving five white men dead. The sheriff then assembled and mobilized “a 
posse of seventy-five” men to the area, an alleged twenty of whom were dispatched to the 
home of Edward Vance, who was “said to have given the order to the negroes to begin 
firing.”122 Accounts differ sharply on what happened next, but regardless, when the 
smoke cleared five white men lay dead, several of the posse, including the sheriff, were 
injured along with “four or five” African Americans. According to his wife Julia, Edward 
Vance escaped, yet one of his sons, John Vance, was killed and another, William Vance, 
was arrested.123 Ali notes that “the number of African American casualties went 
unreported.”124  
The Marion Riot, though largely debated and contradictory in narrative, revealed 
some overarching changes and insecurities in Mississippi. First, the number of African 
Americans who, according to any account, participated in the shooting at Marion was 
significantly lower than the band of between 75 and 100 men who constituted the 
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sheriff’s posse. However, contemporary accounts persistently called the event a “race 
riot” with connotations that a collective force, rather than a handful of men, intentionally 
provoked the disturbance. This revived the white Democratic habit of labelling any black 
political or physical resistance as a “riot” to justify overcompensated violent opposition. 
The Chicago Tribune noted with bitter sarcasm that African Americans’ only guilt rested 
in the fact that they “forgot their constitutional timidity and had the manhood to resent 
[whites’] insults.”125 While this instance did not invoke the “to suppress riots and 
insurrections” clause of Mississippi’s Constitution of 1868, it served as a reminder to the 
Democracy that riots, as they imagined them, could and would still occur. As the 
Meridian Riot of a decade before had proven, binary extralegal militias again ruled state 
politics in Mississippi.  
Another important feature of the Marion Riot of 1881 was its emphasis on and 
denunciation of fusion politics. The Salt Lake Daily Herald concluded its coverage of the 
event by explaining that “the fusionists’ doctrine for negroes to carry pistols to the polls 
was the cause of the disturbance.”126 The Daily Memphis Avalanche made a similar 
statement, mentioning furthermore that “three kegs of powder and a large supply of 
buckshot was found in Vance’s house” after the riot.127 By highlighting the fusionist 
aspect of the riot, these newspapers undergirded already present fears about rising 
African American political power in the state and discouraged other potential fusionists 
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from participating in what was labeled an underhanded practice. The idea that 
Redemption had secured political hegemony for white Democrats faltered before the 
sheer numbers from which coalitions between African Americans and independent whites 
could draw. Early in the 1880s, then, the Marion Riot both revealed the presence of 
fusionists and offered an opportunity to quell cooperative sentiment among whites on the 
fence.  
 By mid-decade, the state militia began to restrengthen itself in correlation to 
growing black political organization. In 1885, The Clarion out of Jackson, Mississippi 
published a report by the Adjutant General of Mississippi with a full listing of the state’s 
twenty known militia units, their officers, and the realization that “many of these 
companies are not in active state of organization” and that “there may be other new ones 
that are not included in the list.”128 The militia, dormant since 1876, began the journey 
back to prominence. The Clarion’s listing signified a renewed interest in the state of the 
militia and its capabilities if needed, along with an implicit call for any unofficial militias 
or white paramilitary groups (“new ones”) to become official. However, while the militia 
regained its footing, further turmoil in the state revealed that Democrats were not yet 
ready to deploy it.  
Violations of the delicate, poorly defined or understood intersections of race, 
labor, and politics continued to produce bloodshed in Mississippi, and black political 
organizing coincided with another so-called “riot” on March 16, 1886. The affair began 
with spilled molasses and ended with over ten dead. Ed and Charley Brown, two African 
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American brothers, spilled molasses on a white man named Robert Moore. Moore’s 
friend, a white lawyer named James Liddell, sought retribution. What started as a verbal 
argument ended when “gunfire erupted which left both Liddell and both Browns 
injured.”129 The Browns took Liddell to trial for attempted murder, an act of legal 
participation which shocked the white community. The day of the trial, March 16, “a 
group of 40 or 50 white men, armed with carbines and revolvers, rode up to the Court 
House” and “opened fire on the negroes…Ten negroes were killed and three others 
mortally wounded.”130 While this senseless violence even outraged many whites, 
Mississippi Governor Robert Lowry stated that “The riot was provoked and perpetrated 
by the outrage and conduct of the Negroes.”131 Thus another outbreak of violence 
occurred when African Americans asserted their rights, here the right to charge a white 
man in court. Importantly, Governor Lowry’s proximity to the event caused him to 
grapple with the issue of violent race relations and the way that the state should deal with 
such instances. His response unsurprisingly places full blame on the African American 
men, as it unfailingly would in the future. While the militia was not called out in this 
case, the Carroll County Massacre pushed Lowry to organize a force capable of 
suppressing riots and insurrections in an increasingly turbulent state.  
 Two months after the Carroll County Massacre, Governor Lowry established 
“Camp Lowry” in Vicksburg, where militia training occurred over five days.132 Less than 
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one month after that, Mississippi Adjutant General William Henry issued General Order 
Number 4, which “ordered that all military Companies, now organized, shall be enlisted 
and mustered into the service of the State at as early a date as practicable,” while listing 
several more measures for the Adjutant General to keep a record of the state militia’s 
manpower and consequent capability. 133 The Carroll County Massacre thereby 
accelerated the process of reforming the state militia into a functional force, as the need 
to suppress riots and insurrections became increasingly obvious to governor Lowry.  
 Mississippi’s renewed interest in the state militia occurred in the context of 
developments throughout the entire New South. As the works of Ayers and Woodward 
have noted, the New South experienced some economic growth and modernization in the 
late nineteenth century through the combined efforts of southern politicians and northern 
investors.134 However, industrial growth and labor often contradicted the deeply 
ingrained agrarianism and labor relationships of southern states. Ayers furthermore 
argues that southerners had cheap and easy access to weapons, and “when politics and 
economic turmoil constantly threw people into conflict, such weaponry and violence 
could easily spark interracial bloodshed.”135 While Democratic interest in the state militia 
reflected growing party insecurity, it also underscored the trend of modernization and 
industry in the late nineteenth century to upset social codes and produce widespread 
interest in state-sanctioned enforcement.  
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 Local and national political events only increased Democratic Party paranoia as 
the 1880s wore on. As the Carroll County Massacre ended, the Black Populist Movement 
“took organizational form in 1886 with the creation of various mutual-aid societies and 
labor unions.”136 Though not yet a political organization, the growth of Black Populism 
united disadvantaged farmers in the Mississippi Delta of both races.  On a federal level, 
McMillen summarizes that “in 1888, for the first time since 1872, the Republican party 
won control of the presidency and both houses of Congress.”137 The Republicans utterly 
defeated the Democrats on the federal level, and southern states like Mississippi 
continued to face fusion between African Americans and poor white farmers at home. By 
1889, then, Governor Lowry, no longer inundated with the idea of Democratic 
hegemony, sought a way to destroy the Republican Party in Mississippi, end fusionist 
political activity, and secure the Democratic Party against federal threats. The Black 
Populist Movement, headed by Oliver Cromwell, offered a perfect scapegoat.  
 The stage for the state militia’s resurrection became Leflore County. Events in 
late August placed citizens of Leflore County on high alert and caught Governor Lowry’s 
attention. On August 23, “Capt. S. H. Whitworth…was waylaid and murdered by a party 
of unknown men near his home in Leflore County.”138 Governor Lowry personally 
offered a $500 reward for the capture of the assassins, and, more importantly, urged “all 
officers of this State to be diligent in their efforts to arrest said fugitive.”139 This incident 
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reveals the tension in Leflore County on the heels of a publicized murder, giving citizens 
a reason to be uneasy. By calling on the “officers of this State,” Lowry’s language also 
shifted toward organized force as a means of restoring control which, with the right 
spark, would translate easily into deploying state militia units.  
 Meanwhile, Oliver Cromwell promoted political and economic solidarity among 
black and white farmers in the same area. By September of 1889, he was actively 
“encouraging black farmers in the county to trade with a white Alliance cooperative store 
some thirty miles away in Durant, Holmes County, instead of with local white shop 
owners who were price gouging.”140 Cromwell not only organized black farmers into the 
Colored Farmers’ Alliance, but he mobilized those farmers in fusionist solidarity with 
white farmers of the similar, though all white, Southern Farmers’ Alliance. Democrats 
reeled at the successful cooperation between the poor black and whites of Leflore 
County, and Cromwell became an easy target for attempts to destroy the farmers’ 
traction.  
 While the Colored Farmers’ Alliance under Cromwell pursued primarily 
economic goals, his methods resembled those of a politician. Cromwell not only 
organized black economic independence, “he also gave a strong example of personal 
independence by occasionally delivering bold speeches to rally support for his cause.”141 
Cromwell consequently embodied the fears of white planters in the Mississippi Delta 
economically and ideologically. Cromwell’s speeches spelled danger if they bridged the 
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short gap between the economic and political. The planters responded swiftly. In late 
August, Cromwell received, “a letter signed anonymously with crossbones, skeleton, etc. 
ordering him to quit his work and leave the country, giving him ten days.”142 Cromwell, 
an experienced soldier, stood his ground, as did the African Americans who organized 
under him. The Colored Farmers’ Alliance members of Leflore County met and that 
“same evening the whites at Shell Mound [Mississippi] received a threatening letter from 
parties of negroes who signed themselves ‘Three Thousand Armed Men.’”143 
 The ancient fears of an armed Black uprising dovetailed with exaggerated – 
almost hysterical – rumors about the size of the Black force to color white perceptions of 
events in Leflore County. Though the letter implied a force of three thousand men, The 
Daily Commercial Herald ironically estimated the next day that “there has never by 
actual count been more than two hundred negroes at Minter City [Leflore County], and 
they were not disposed to be aggressive” continuing that even if more people had been 
gathered, it was likely “more for the purpose of self-protection than anything else.”144 
Regardless of the actual number, the idea of a large body of armed African Americans, 
whether 200 or 3,000, terrified the white community and brought Governor Robert 
Lowry personally to Leflore County accompanied by three units of the state militia.  
 Lowry’s involvement in Leflore County highlights the political nature of calling 
out the state militia. Rather than order out militia units that were already close to the site 
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of the alleged uprising, Lowry personally caught a train and “went up Sunday to 
Greenwood, ordered out the Capitol Light Guards and other troops belonging to the 
militia,” including three companies “organized at Yazoo City, Grenada, Carrollton, and 
Greenwood.”145 Lowry’s march alongside the militia proposed to show bravery and 
courage in meeting a riotous force. The politics of the event may also be seen in that 
Lowry and two other public officials “made speeches from the hotel veranda, in which 
moderation was counselled, and the advice given to arrest the ring leaders and let the law 
take its course.” The speeches were reported to have “had a fine effect and served to quiet 
the people in some measure.”146 Mobilizing the militia and giving speeches upon its 
arrival served a symbolic purpose by reassuring whites that the state militia still existed to 
“suppress riots and insurrections,” though for opposite purposes than the Reconstruction 
militia. Lowry successfully made his point, and the brief scare of insurrection seemed to 
be effectively suppressed. However, when Lowry left Leflore County, the militia stayed.  
 After Lowry’s departure, “part of the men were detailed to go in different 
directions and make a thorough search of the entire surrounding country in order to 
discover [the African Americans’] whereabouts.”147 Here, accounts become hazy, yet 
many records indicate that horrible violence occurred to different degrees after the 
governor returned to Jackson. While newspapers recorded violence from ambiguous foes, 
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one reporter specifically noted that “’African Americans were hunted down like dogs,’” 
and that “one sixteen-year-old guardsman beat a child to death while his older brother 
held the parents at bay with a gun.”148 This account contradicts other newspapers which 
signified the militia’s removal alongside Governor Lowry, inculcating the state militia as 
an instigator of, rather than means to prevent, unrest.  
 Newspapers around the country estimated the total dead anywhere from zero to 
over one hundred people.149 However, historian William F. Holmes concludes that “it 
seems – based on the sources consulted – that the whites killed about twenty-five 
blacks.”150 Ten specific deaths can be determined by newspaper reports. One newspaper 
as far away as Lancaster, Pennsylvania, reported specific names for eight of the dead: 
“John Boyker, Dol Wharton, Monroe Jones, Scott Marsh, Warren Snell, Theyton Lock, 
Ben. Lock, and Warren Beckworth.”151 By September 28, one of the chief organizers in 
Leflore County, George Allen, reportedly “was hung in Leflore County for his 
participation in the late disturbance there.”152 Specific references to those murdered 
reveal that the combination of the state militia and volunteer paramilitary groups in 
Leflore County did not stay in Leflore County “to suppress riots and insurrections.” 
Instead, it used the language of a race riot to hunt down and murder African Americans 
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and to assert Democratic hegemony where it seemed to be wavering. Finally, Wiley 
Anderson, who lived through the spike of bloodshed in Leflore County, committed 
suicide on September 28 for reasons that are not made clear but are implied stem from the 
recent events there.153 
Despite begin driven from Leflore County, Cromwell’s legend only grew in the 
coming weeks.  The Daily Commercial Herald stated that Cromwell passed through 
Vicksburg as early as the night of September 2.154 Whether true or not, Cromwell was 
never captured in Leflore County while the militia combed the area. As of September 6, 
The Yazoo Herald reported that his “whereabouts at present are unknown, but there are 
about 75 or 100 men searching the woods …”155 Regardless of exactly where Cromwell 
disappeared to, the militia had accomplished the white planters’ and Democrats’ goal of 
driving him from Leflore County, and breaking black political power. Cromwell’s 
portrayal in newspaper accounts also indicates a trend in the overall construction of race 
riots in the period. Cromwell was repeatedly referred to in newspaper renderings as an 
“ex-convict,” to both undermine his political actions and imply lawlessness in African 
American political groups. Though no paper specifically referenced what criminal 
activity Cromwell held that title for, The Vicksburg Herald from August 7, 1875 stated 
that “Oliver Cromwell was arrested for drunkenness in Houston, Texas,” and that “they 
fined the old Ironsides, too.”156 This description not only provides an explanation for the 
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repeated references to Cromwell as an ex-convict, it reveals that he was a notably public 
figure, designated “old Ironsides,” even before the Clinton Riot.  
 The Clinton Riot of 1875 did, however, add to his budding renown, contributing 
another layer to the descriptions of his presence in Leflore County in 1889. At least two 
newspapers described Cromwell as both and ex-convict and a principle leader of the 
Clinton Riot of 1875.157  The emphasis on Cromwell’s criminality couples with his 
presence at Clinton to portray him as a repeatedly militant rioter, ignoring the far greater 
number of African Americans who were murdered at both Clinton and Leflore County.  
 While certain papers described the events at Leflore County as a riot, and two 
used the word insurrection, the event became known as the Leflore County Massacre.158 
As opposed to Meridian, Clinton, Marion, and Carroll County, African Americans in 
Leflore County never fired a shot. A threatened force of African Americans existed only 
on paper as far as anyone could prove, yet Lowry chose this instance as the one befitting 
state militia. By labeling the events at Leflore County an insurrection, the governor could 
then mobilize the state militia with impunity under the Constitution of 1868 at a time 
when a public, militant show of Democratic Party strength could resecure its hegemony. 
Lowry’s act succeeded. White planters in the area who operated the Durant Commercial 
Store, also members of the Southern Farmers’ Alliance, publicly denounced and 
abandoned the Colored Farmers’ Alliance in the aftermath of Leflore County.159 Holmes 
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notes that “with so many of the Colored Alliance leaders killed and driven away and with 
so many of the remaining blacks terrorized, the Colored Alliance movement in Leflore 
County collapsed.”160 The fusionism Democrats so feared was abandoned. If any rural 
white farmers had begun to sympathize with black farmers through shared plight, Lowry 
effectively redirected their attention back to racialized Democratic Party loyalty.  
 One of the most important results of the Leflore County Massacre was its 
influence in pushing the state to its next, and current, constitution. The Clarion-Ledger of 
November 21, 1889 printed verbatim the Constitution of 1868 under the title “The 
Constitution of the State of Mississippi as it now Stands – Read it and Judge for Yourself 
of its Shortcomings.” The Leflore County Massacre’s influence on this call to action 
appears in that the piece begins with Article IX, the militia article.161 An effort to rewrite 
the state constitution briefly arose in 1886, notably the same year as the Carroll County 
Massacre, but it was shot down on the grounds that “an effort to limit negro suffrage 
would bring evils upon the state in the way of adverse congressional legislation and 
Federal administrative proceedings.’”162 Here again one may see the pattern where any 
form of African American resistance, even self-defense, sparks an overcompensation of 
white backlash. After the Leflore County Massacre, though, Mississippi’s Democrats 
would be sufficiently concerned about their political future to legalize black 
disenfranchisement.  
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 The state militia arose as an important point of contention between the delegates. 
Some of the arguments over whether to keep the state militia stemmed from economic, 
rather than racial, lines, yet those determined to keep the militia did so with the 
assumption that it would be all white.163 However, arguments extended beyond a purely 
racial sphere. While some argued that a state militia would be an effective use of state 
funds, “McLaurin of Rankin County…opposed the idea of a ‘standing army’ and 
indicated that ‘we only have the newspaper reports about the Greenwood affair cited by 
gentlemen.’”164 The ideological aversion to organized troops which developed after the 
Civil War evidently still haunted some of Mississippi’s delegates, as did the much more 
recent Leflore County Massacre. Others, such as J. Z. George, favored a state militia 
from personal experience with its usefulness. George was a ringleader in the Redemption 
movement of 1875 and favored an organized militia because “‘in his own experience he 
had known the necessity of suppressing racial disturbances.”165 All agreed that the militia 
should be a white-only arm of the government. The debate around the militia then 
revolved more specifically around the phrase “to suppress riots and insurrections” which 
had inspired every instance of militia use since the phrase’s conception in 1868.  
 The delegates continued to argue for and against a specific militia clause based on 
the racial component of a militia, how to fund it, and whether mob violence would not 
serve as an apt substitute.166 In the end, the militia remained as a direct descendant of the 
Constitution of 1868. The phrase “to suppress riots and insurrections,” lived on, 
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sustaining the governor’s racial and political control mechanism.167 Though the wording 
of the law does not prohibit African American participation, the disenfranchisement 
brought on by the new constitution coupled with the violence of the preceding years 
effectively excluded blacks in practice. The tie between securing white supremacy in the 
south and the state militia appeared immediately after the Constitution of 1890. In a wave 
of Confederate commemoration throughout the south, the Adjutant General of 
Mississippi’s yearly report places the state militia in Richmond, Virginia at “the 
unveiling of the statue of General Robert E. Lee, on May 29, 1890.”168 
 Governor Robert Lowry, then, resurrected the state militia to combat local 
Republican and fusionist challenges and to preserve Mississippi as a place of white, 
Democratic power. Lowry borrowed the formula directly from Adelbert Ames in 1875, 
but two factors differentiate the two. First, Ames was reticent at Clinton, while Lowry 
was decisive at Leflore County. The second distinguishing factor explains the first. Ames 
necessarily composed his militia largely, though not entirely, of African American troops, 
while Lowry commanded white ones. While race did not reflect the potential quality of 
the troops, the racial component in both cases mediated the actions of each respective 
governor. For example, Ames’s reticence can be understood as an effort to prevent a race 
war or further violence, and he also had far fewer voluntary troops at his disposal and 
lacked the support of his own legislature and the federal government. Boldness aside, 
 
167 Constitution of the State of Mississippi, Adopted November 1, 1890, Article 
IX, Sec. 217.  
168 Biennial Report of the Adjutant General of the State of Mississippi for the 
Term Ending January 1st, 1892, (Jackson: Power and McNeily, State Printers, 1892). 
University of California, 2018, 14.  
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Ames stood in an untenable and isolated position. Lowry, on the other hand, employed 
white troops bent on going to Leflore County whether in the militia or independently, 
easing the burden of recruitment. Lowry’s swift action and availability of zealous troops 
in Leflore County then allowed him to make the state militia an arm of the state for 
protecting white Democratic interests, manipulating the phrase “to suppress riots and 
insurrections” exactly as Adelbert Ames had fourteen years before. The state militia 
thereby stood at the nexus of change and continuity in Mississippi as Reconstruction died 





Oliver Cromwell’s experiences with the state militia offer a lens through which to study 
the development of white supremacy in late nineteenth century Mississippi. The 
Constitution of 1868 opened militia service to Black Mississippians and, in turn, allowed 
them to defend their civil and political rights. Republican Governor Adelbert Ames 
realized the usefulness of the state militia in preserving his and his party’s power in the 
state, yet his mishandling of that militia “to suppress riots and insurrections” led to his 
ruin. Though numerous Black Mississippians expressed a desire to fill the militia’s ranks, 
the threat of a full-fledged race war, the growing precariousness of his own political 
power, and a depleting personal belief in the militia’s effectiveness prevented Ames from 
substantially deploying units. When Ames finally allowed the militia to muster, white 
violence decreased, if only for a moment, revealing a pattern wherein legal, state-backed 
military force intimidated paramilitary groups nearly every time they came in contact. 
Nevertheless, Ames’s tentative commitment to the militia created a political and social 
climate that diminished political opportunity for black Mississippians.  
The fall of Reconstruction in Mississippi signaled the fall of the state militia for a 
brief time. Paramilitary mob violence ruled as the primary body of enforcement in the 
state until the mid-1880s, when fusion tickets threatened the Democratic Party’s 
stranglehold on state politic. The combination of those trends sparked renewed interest in 
the state militia as a functional arm of the state. By 1889, when Democratic Governor 
Robert Lowry perceived a need to reinforce his party’s hegemony in Mississippi, he, like 
Ames, chose the state militia to perform a symbolic show of force in Leflore County, 
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Mississippi. However, though Democratic newspapers portrayed the militia as having 
arrived at Leflore County and made their point quietly, they remained after the governor 
left the county, becoming an active threat and resulting in the bloodshed of the Leflore 
County Massacre of 1889. The Democratic Party’s militia-based success stifled black and 
fusionist political activity in the state, causing the state’s legislators to preserve it in the 
new Constitution of 1890. The state militia then, while its written and unwritten purposes 
remained the same, transformed between 1865 and 1890 from a Republican tool for 
preserving African-American rights to a Democratic weapon for ensuring black 
disenfranchisement.  
While many studies of the period and, more specifically, of the Clinton Riot of 
1875 and Leflore County Massacre of 1889 diminish the militia’s role, the extensive 
coverage that military companies received in newspapers suggest that they may have had 
an outsized role in shaping popular perceptions of these events. The Meridian, Vicksburg, 
and Clinton Riots of the 1870s sparked the end of Reconstruction and the beginning of 
Redemption, and the state militia stood at the center of both events. Throughout the 
1880s, as the underrepresented in Mississippi challenged the Democratic Party, the state 
militia again became the primary response for meeting that challenge. Coverage of the 
Leflore County Massacre likewise stressed first the need for, then the presence of, the 
state militia, but with a very different make-up from the militia of the 1870s. Such 
accounts prove that the state militia was central to Mississippian’s understanding of the 
turmoil surrounding them. 
 The phrase “to suppress riots and insurrections,” found in both the 1868 and 1890 
constitutions, remained the keystone for militia organization and deployment. The 
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Clinton Riot of 1875 and the Leflore County Massacre of 1889 offer two key instances 
when alleged rioting necessitated the militia. Both instances saw ex post facto militia 
involvement. While Oliver Cromwell’s militia parade technically meant that militiamen 
were present at Clinton, their presence was not state ordered. Governor Ames’s decision 
to muster the militia after the riot was not only ineffective in suppressing violence, it 
exacerbated racial tensions. Similarly, Governor Lowry sent the militia to Leflore County 
after an alleged black uprising, but when Lowry arrived with the militia in tow, no 
violence was to be found. Both parties then, deployed the militia under the “to suppress 
riots and insurrections” clause as a response to political pressure instead of a proactive 
arm of enforcement. The difference remained that the Democrat-heavy militia of 1889 
perpetuated violence without (recorded) state sanction. Both parties keyed in on the same 
phrase and manipulated the militia in the same general way.  
While examining the state militia offers crucial insight into late-nineteenth-
century Mississippi, the narratives of both riots as written by contemporary sources speak 
to modern issues of race, representation, and civilian force. Composed of ordinary 
citizens, the state militia became an important institution for carving out individual rights 
among Mississippians. After 1865, both Republicans and Democrats in Mississippi 
sought paramilitary protection for their opposing political and social agendas through the 
Union League and Ku Klux Klan. However, the fate of the state militia in the late 
nineteenth century ultimately excluded African Americans from legal armed protection 
while providing sanction to white paramilitarism. The importance of citizen soldiering 
and citizen-based public enforcement may be seen in Mississippi’s state militia., 
highlighting how state institutions allegedly for the protection of all citizens can be 
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manipulated to exclude and disarm certain populations. Regardless of the legislated 
purpose of the militia, African Americans were first protected, then attacked by that 
institution based on access to participation within it. For everyday citizens of both races, 
then, Mississippi’s state militia in the late-nineteenth century became a present and 
important method for determining who would have rights and how those rights would be 
enforced.  
The terms “riot” and “insurrection” used to muster the militia were almost entirely 
exaggerated based on the facts of each instance to which they were applied. At Clinton, 
Marion, Carroll County, and Leflore County, each respective white mob or militia far 
outnumbered those of African Americans. Furthermore, only at Marion did an African 
American incite violence by shooting (though accounts for Clinton and Carroll County 
were contentious). While black Mississippians faced nearly constant threats from 
extralegal mobs, Ayers notes that throughout the south, “when blacks did turn against 
whites, they risked terrible retribution from other whites.”169 The relatively small 
numbers of African Americans involved in the disputes could not justify the mass 
murders of innocent civilians who were often nowhere near the scene of the incident. In 
comparison, there are no recorded instances within this period of Mississippi’s history 
where white mob violence, arguably more prevalent, was deemed insurrectionary or 
riotous. These instances, then, offer comparisons to modern ones where media 
representations depict African American protests as “riots” and stress criminality therein.  
 
169 Ayers, The Promise of the New South, 155.  
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 Individual representation also influenced the events of this study. Not only did the 
phrase “riot” connote lawlessness broadly for African American political organizing, 
individual descriptions of the events’ black participants augmented criminal rhetoric. For 
example, Charles Caldwell at the Clinton Riot was originally described as a peacekeeper, 
yet as black power grew through use of the state militia, newspapers retrospectively 
called him an instigator.170 Ironically, in the aftermath of the Clinton Riot, it was African 
Americans’ insistence on lawfulness by waiting for the legal state militia rather than 
mimicking the lawless mob violence of many white contemporaries that ultimately 
contributed to their loss of political power. Oliver Cromwell’s descriptions likewise 
referred to him as an “ex-convict” on numerous occasions. To circumvent the political 
activity of two men fighting for their newfound rights, popular accounts discredited their 
character. These depictions created an association between African American political 
activity and criminality which haunts the United States even today.  
 The transformation of Mississippi’s state militia consequently coincided with the 
degradation of African-American opportunity in Mississippi, and one man’s 
extraordinary, though scarcely documented, life offers a prime illustration of how black 
Mississippians experienced this transformation. Oliver Cromwell embodies the 
transformation of Mississippi’s state militia as a member of that militia in 1868 and a 
victim of it in 1890. His legacy exists now only in oral family histories, and his death 
personified the determined, if failed, efforts of African Americans to protect their rights 
and their postwar gains. Cromwell’s escape from the horrors of Leflore County only 
 
170 “Departure of Militia,” The Canton Mail, October 16, 1875, 3. 
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bought him a week. Tracked down by white supremacists, his life ended in a gunfight 
where he took five of his attackers with him.171 From the Civil War, through the Clinton 
Riot of 1875, to the Leflore County Massacre of 1889, Cromwell fought literally and 
metaphorically until his final breath to secure rights for himself and all African 
Americans in Mississippi. Though newspapers of the period often presented him in an 
unfavorable light, they unknowingly preserved his myth and legacy, capturing a voice 
that still deserves to be heard
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